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Abstract 
Uganda is one of the most biologically diverse countries in Africa. Most of its 
biodiversity is represented within a system of national parks, wild life reserves 
and forest reserves. In 1991, Bwindi forest was turned into a National Park which 
led to conflicts between communities and park managers due to resource use 
restrictions. In 1996, a strategy of local participation was established by Uganda 
Wildlife Authority. This strategy included the involvement of local people in 
benefit sharing, resource use schemes and decision-making processes.  
This study examines the involvement and participation of local people in 
collaborative resource management at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park. It 
describes practices and local people‘s perceptions toward their involvement in 
these conservation initiatives. Employing theories on Power and participation, an 
analysis has been made of the findings and in comparison to Pretty‘s ladder of 
participation, local participation at Bwindi has been evaluated. Data has been 
collected through household and key informant interviews, participatory 
observation and examination of written material.  
I found that local people living around Bwindi are involved in three main aspects 
of collaborative resource management. These aspects are revenue sharing, 
multiple resource use and problem animal management. Results show that 
although these aspects provide avenues for local involvement, they do to a 
limited degree imply active forms of local participation, especially in decision-
making aspect. Relying on elected representatives in decision-making structures 
and institutions is also a challenge due to limited consultation with electorates 
and accusations of corruption and nepotism. Decision-making power remains in 
the hands of those in authority and local people have no power to make or 
influence park related decisions. Thus, there is still need to review the notion of 
local participation at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park in terms of 
empowerment, equitable sharing of rights and responsibilities. 
 vi 
List of abreviations 
BIFCT Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust 
BINP  Bwindi Impenetrable National Park 
CARE  Christian Action Research and Education  
CPI  Community Protected Area Institution 
CRM  Collaborative Resource Management 
GEF  Global Environmental Fund 
GMP  General Management Plan  
HUGO Human Gorilla Conflict Resolution Group 
IGCP  International Gorilla Conservation Programme 
ITFC  Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation 
LC  Local Council 
MGNP Mgahinga Gorilla National Park 
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding 
MUZ  Multiple Use Zone 
MWLE Ministry of Water, Land and Environment 
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation 
PA  Protected Area 
SUM  Centre for Environment and Development 
UNCST Uganda National Council for Science and Technology   
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UWA  Uganda Wildlife Authority 
WCED World  Conference on Environment and Development 
WWF  World Wide Fund for Nature 
 vii 
Table of Contents 
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................................................ I 
DEDICATION .......................................................................................................................................... II 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ....................................................................................................................... III 
ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................................ V 
LIST OF ABREVIATIONS .................................................................................................................... VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................... VII 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 RESEARCH AIM, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................ 4 
1.3 RATIONALE ................................................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ........................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... 7 
2. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................... 8 
2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 8 
2.2 POWER IN COLLABORATIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ................................................................. 8 
2.3 LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN COLLABORATIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ....................................... 12 
2.4 COLLABORATIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT BINP ................................................................. 16 
2.4.1 Implementation of collaborative resource management at BINP .................................... 19 
2.5 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 22 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 23 
3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 23 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN...................................................................................................................... 23 
3.3 THE AREA OF STUDY AND THE INFORMANTS ............................................................................... 25 
3.3.1 Selection of Kabale District as the study area ................................................................. 25 
3.3.2 Selection of the informants ............................................................................................... 27 
3.4 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................... 27 
3.4.1 Documents ....................................................................................................................... 28 
3.4.2 Interviews ......................................................................................................................... 30 
3.4.3 Participant observation.................................................................................................... 32 
3.5 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ......................................................................................................... 34 
3.5.1 Prior to the Field ............................................................................................................. 34 
3.5.2 During the field study ....................................................................................................... 35 
3.5.3 Confidentiality and anonymity ......................................................................................... 35 
3.6 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ....................................................................................................... 36 
 viii 
3.6.1 Reliability ......................................................................................................................... 36 
3.6.2 Validity ............................................................................................................................. 37 
3.7 DATA ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 37 
3.8 SELF REFLECTION ON THE FIELD WORK ....................................................................................... 38 
3.9 LIMITATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 39 
3.10 SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. 40 
4. INVOLVING LOCAL PEOPLE IN THE THREE MAIN ASPECTS OF 
COLLABORATIVE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT BINP ......................................................... 41 
4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 41 
4.2 ASPECT ONE: REVENUE SHARING ................................................................................................ 41 
4.2.1 Practices and perceptions ................................................................................................ 45 
4.3 ASPECT TWO: MULTIPLE RESOURCE USE ..................................................................................... 50 
4.3.1 Practices and perceptions ................................................................................................ 52 
4.4 ASPECT THREE: PROBLEM ANIMAL MANAGEMENT ...................................................................... 56 
4.4.1 Practices and perceptions ................................................................................................ 58 
4.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 62 
5. LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING AT BINP ............................................ 64 
5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 64 
5.2 INVOLVING LOCAL PEOPLE IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES AT BINP ....................................... 64 
5.1.1 The local government structure in Uganda...................................................................... 65 
5.1.2 Local government and local participation in decision making at BINP .......................... 66 
5.3 EVALUATING LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING AT   BINP ........................................ 75 
5.4 SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 81 
6. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................ 83 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................ 86 
Appendix I: List of key informant organisations and local interviews recorded at BINP in Nov. 
2008 .................................................................................................................................................... i 
Appendix II: Research permit for the field study .............................................................................. iii 
Appendix III: Gorrilla tracking certificate received during participatory observation .................... iv 
Appendix IV: Interview guide for key informants ............................................................................... v 
Appendix V: Interview guide for local people ................................................................................... vi 
 ix 
List of Tables 
TABLE 1: PRETTY‘S TYPOLOGY OF PARTICIPATION 14 
TABLE 2: DECISION-MAKING LEVELS IN UGANDA REGARDING CONSERVATION 67 
TABLE 3: TYPES OF LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING AT BINP 80 
 
List of Figures 
FIGURE 1: LOCATION OF MY SAMPLE PARISHES (NYAMABARE AND MUSHANJE) AND THE OTHER PARISHES 
THAT BORDER BINP. INSET IS A MAP OF UGANDA SHOWING THE LOCATION OF BINP. .................... 26 
FIGURE 2: A PHOTO OF THE COMMUNITY IN ONE OF THE VILLAGE MEETINGS I ATTENDED. ........................ 34 
FIGURE 3: PHOTO OF A MOUNTAIN GORILLA AT BINP TAKEN BY RESEARCHER. ......................................... 42 
FIGURE 4: A FLOWCHART SHOWING REVENUE SHARING CHANNELS AMONG BINP COMMUNITIES ............. 44 
FIGURE 5: A MAP SHOWING MULTIPLE RESOURCE USE ZONES (MUZS) AT BINP ........................................ 51 
FIGURE 6: CLEAR PARK BOUNDARY FROM CULTIVATED PLOTS OF LAND AT BINP ..................................... 57 
 1 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Conservation efforts have historically been dominated by efforts to separate 
humans from nature and reserving places for nature (Brockington 2002). In the 
colonial period, there was a concern of over-exploitation of natural resources by 
local people. Therefore, forest reserves and national parks were established, and 
policies were formulated to guide their management. A key turning point was on 
1
st
 March 1872, when the US established Yellowstone National Park as the 
world‘s first national park (National Park Service 2007).  
Consequently, starting with the 1890s there was a proliferation of national parks. 
Wherever a national park was created, people were separated from nature. This 
involved, but was not limited to, eviction of people who had been resident in 
those areas as hunter-gatherers, and stopping consumptive usage of the resources 
on these lands. In essence a fence was constructed around such a Protected Area 
(PA) and trespassing carried a fine. The approach therefore came to be known as 
the fences and fines approach but has a host of other names such as fortress 
conservation. This became the conservation paradigm for much of the 20
th
 
century (Hutton et al. 2005).  
Gradually, the fortress conservation paradigm lost dominance and was 
increasingly challenged because of its exclusion of local participation (Namara 
2006). Local people increasingly voiced their concerns and got support from 
human rights activists. But also, in its own self-interest the conservation 
constituency behind fortress conservation saw it that their paradigm could not 
survive, at least politically, amidst resistance by the local people and leaders in 
newly independent countries (Hutton et al. 2005). This precipitated an 
ideological shift in conservation policy stressing local participation and 
involvement in benefit sharing in collaborative resource management. It also 
ushered in a community conservation paradigm which became popular and 
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rapidly won over many converts in the 1980s (Fischer 1995; Adams et al. 2001). 
Consequently, many protected areas, that had previously gone the fortress way, 
sought to have ways in which local people would participate. Uganda, like many 
African and indeed other developing countries jumped onto the bandwagon. 
Uganda converted six of her major forest reserves into national parks between 
1991 and 1993 (Tumusiime 2006). One of these parks, which I chose for my case 
study, is Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP).  
Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) is located in south western Uganda 
between latitude 0
o
53` - 1
o
8`South and longititude 39
o
35-`29
o
50`E (Mwima & 
McNeilage 2003) (Figure 1). It covers an area of 321 km
2
 on the edge of the 
western rift valley occupying the highest blocks of the Kigezi highlands (Babaasa 
et al. 2004). BINP lies along the boarder of Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) and is about 29 km by road to Kabale town, 30 km north of Kisoro town 
and about 540 km from the capital city; Kampala.  
The park is also shared by some of the most densely populated districts in 
Uganda which are Kisoro 324 people/ km
2 
, Kanungu 163people/ km
2 
 and 
Kabale 281people/km
2 
 which is above the national average of 122.8people/ km
2
 
(Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2002). BINP lies in an altitudinal range from 
1160m at the northern tip to 2607m at Rwamanyonyi hill on the eastern edge of 
the park. Its topography is extremely rugged with narrow steep sided valleys that 
were formed through up-warping of the western Rift valley (Harcourt 1981). It is 
also a major water catchment area in Uganda, hence a source of many rivers that 
flow North West and South into Lake Edward.  
Its annual mean temperature is 13
o
C and annual mean rainfall at 1440mm 
especially between the months of March-April and August-November. The park 
is thus, critical to the hydrological balance of the region and the country at large 
(UWA 2001). BINP is also the country‘s most biologically diverse and important 
Afromontane forest famously known as a habitant for at least ten species said to 
be threatened with global extinction and for this reason it was placed on the 
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World Heritage list by UNESCO in 1994 (UWA 2001).The park is also widely 
known for being home to more than half of the world‘s remaining population of 
the critically endangered mountain gorillas (Gorilla gorilla beringei) 
(Kamugisha et al. 1997; Hamilton et al. 2000; Namara 2006) 
Prior to its gazzettement as a national park in 1991, Bwindi was a designated 
forest reserve; regulations about the right to access the forest resources were 
more liberal and not often enforced (Mutebi 2003). Bwindi was a source of 
timber, minerals, non timber forest products, game meat and agricultural land to 
the local communities living in and adjacent to it (Korbee 2007). These activities 
led to continued significant losses of forest cover due to heavy encroachment and 
settlement up to the late 1980s. Consequently in 1991 BINP became a national 
park. Among other changes, this led to the eviction of over 2,400 people who 
were living inside the forest reserve in 1992.  
This reclassification therefore, had a large impact on local people, who were no 
longer permitted to enter the park or access its resources at free will. This led to 
resentment and conflict between the local communities and park authorities 
(Namara 2006). As such, Uganda followed the paradigm shift in conservation 
from restricted resource management areas to involving local people through 
community conservation at BINP as well as at some of the other national parks. 
Following the framework of the international policy terrain, for example the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP 1992), Principle 10 of the Rio 
Declaration and Agenda 21 (United Nations 1992), Uganda has put in place a 
number of national policy provisions such as the National Environment Policy 
(Republic of Uganda 1994) and the Uganda Wildlife Statute (Republic of 
Uganda 1996) among others to provide for public participation in natural 
resource management.  
As a result, several approaches have been undertaken around BINP to involve 
and to benefit local people through benefit sharing in the two of the three main 
aspects of collaborative resource management. The first of these aspects is the 
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sharing of part of the revenue collected from gorilla tourism at BINP. The other 
aspect is multiple resource use where resource use agreements have been signed 
with some communities living adjacent to BINP, allowing the residents to collect 
selected park resources particularly for subsistence use.  
Though communities are sometimes optimistic about such collaborative 
arrangements because these agreements at least promise some physical and 
monetary benefits at BINP (Hinchley et al. 1998), there are claims by some 
researchers that the arrangements have largely failed due to limited local 
participation, for example in deciding which park resources are to be harvested 
(Blomley 2001; Mutebi 2003; Namara & Nsabagasani 2003). Furthermore, they 
argue that there is limited local participation in decision-making processes 
especially on how to use the revenues returned to the local people from park 
entry fees and local empowerment is very minimal.  
This therefore, raises the need for an in-depth examination and understanding of 
issues relating to involvement and local participation in collaborative resource 
management as a sustainable conservation approach in the management of 
protected areas. This study is thus an attempt to explore the concepts of 
involvement and local participation in the various aspects of collaborative 
resource management at BINP. 
1.2 Research aim, research objectives and research 
questions 
The aim of this study is to examine the involvement and participation of local 
people in collaborative resource management at BINP, Uganda. The main 
research question is: how can local involvement and participation in 
collaborative resource management at BINP be described and evaluated?  
I divide this into two objectives: 
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Objective 1 is to describe how local people living adjacent to BINP are 
involved in the three main aspects of collaborative resource management. 
These three aspects are; revenue sharing, multiple resource use and problem 
animal management. The description is made through answering the following 
three questions: 
i. What are the specific aspects in collaborative resource management that are 
of interest to both the park managers and local people at BINP? 
ii. How and at what point are local people involved in the collaborative 
resource management aspects at BINP? 
iii. How do the local people perceive their involvement in the different aspects 
regarding collaborative resource management? 
Objective 2 is to evaluate local participation in decision-making at BINP 
basing on Pretty’s typology of participation. 
i. Given the nature of local people involvement, where on Pretty‘s ―ladder‖ of 
participation can local participation at BINP be placed? 
1.3 Rationale 
It is over two decades since collaborative resource management was pioneered in 
Africa, but as arguments in a variety of fora indicate, the outcomes of the 
approach have been mixed. One key explanatory variable has been the nature and 
extent of local participation (Kamugisha et al. 1997; Wells & McShane 2004). 
Following an increased dominance of a discourse based on community 
conservation, agencies and governments have instituted policies embracing local 
participation in collaborative resource management. However, observers have 
argued that a persistent gap between policy and practice has characterized many 
collaborative arrangements (Mugisha 2002; Namara 2006).  
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BINP is often argued to be a classic case of successful collaborative resource 
management, given the fact that it hosted the first pilot parishes where 
collaborative resource management aspects were practiced before replicating the 
approach in other Ugandan parks, such as Mountain Elgon National Park (Worah 
et al. 2000; Mutebi 2003; Namara & Nsabagasani 2003). However, some 
researchers claim that collaborative resource management practices at BINP have 
not been so successful (Blomley 2001; Ribbot 2001; Borrini-Feyerabend & 
Sandwith 2003Namara 2006). Critics argue that often conservation policies that 
are in place, do not elaborate on what actually is the meaning of local 
participation in decision-making rather than involving local communities in the 
three aspects of collaborative resource management (Fischer 1995).  
Further, Fischer (1995) and Ribbot (2001) argue that local communities should 
have meaningful input into the collaborative resource management process right 
from the start as partners with rights, responsibilities and sharing of power in 
decision-making. It is against this background, that the findings of my thesis will 
make a contribution to the knowledge of how local participation related to 
protected areas takes place in the case of BINP. My study also can be drawn 
upon by local practitioners at BINP as well as at other protected areas to improve 
collaborative resource management practices. Thus, the study adds to the 
international literature that compares involvement and local participation in 
conservation. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis  
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter one gives a brief introduction to the 
problem and highlights the rationale of the study. Chapter two presents the 
theoretical framework as well as the literature review on claims and earlier 
research findings related to local participation at BINP and other protected areas. 
Also some important concepts used in this study are defined in this chapter.  
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Chapter three consists of study area description and presentation of the 
methodology that I used in the study.  
Chapter four provides the research findings on how local people at BINP are 
involved in the three main aspects of collaborative resource management. These 
consist of revenue sharing, multiple resource use and problem animal 
management. The chapter thus addresses objective one of the study.  
Chapter five focuses on objective two by giving a description and an evaluation 
of local participation in the decision-making process at BINP basing on Pretty‘s 
typology of participation. Drawing inspiration from Pretty‘s typology on 
participation (1995), in chapter six conclusions of this study are presented. 
1.5  Summary 
In this chapter, I have given an overview of the research topic, research aim, 
main research question, objectives and rationale. Finally, I have presented the 
structure of the thesis.  
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2. Theory and literature review 
2.1 Introduction 
My study applies various theory elements. First, I apply theories that shade light 
on objective one‘s description of how, at what point and in which aspects of 
collaborative resource management the local people adjacent to BINP are 
involved. These are theories on power, such as the role it plays in collaborative 
resource management.  
The second theory element is to guide my addressing of objective two with the 
evaluation of local participation in the decision-making process at BINP. Here I 
apply a normative theory provided by Pretty et al. (1995) on scales of 
participation.  
Third, my case study is compared to the research findings and claims about local 
participation in BINP and also to central literature on participation in other cases 
of protected areas in Uganda. Fourth, I also refer to central research findings on 
protected areas and participation in other African countries that are of particular 
relevance for my own study. Each of these theory elements are presented in the 
following sub-chapters. 
2.2  Power in collaborative resource management 
Raik et al. (2008:730) claim that a highly technocratic outlook dominates the 
field of natural resource management and conservation. Technical activities like 
the manipulation of fish stocks, establishment of silviculture and the monitoring 
of populations of endangered species all require a high level of professional 
expertise. Although much technical knowledge of natural systems is applied to 
practice in supposedly neutral and disinterested ways, in natural resource 
management –whether intentionally or unintentionally– there is a tendency to 
exclude, dominate, marginalize or otherwise disadvantage some groups (Raik et 
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al. 2008:731). Raik et al. (2008) draw inspiration from previous studies on power 
like Lukes (2005) and refer to three major views of understanding the concept of 
power. They use these views to illustrate how power is operationalized in natural 
resource management. Power can be viewed as coercion, as constraint or as 
consent.  
Power as coercion is what Lukes calls the first dimension of power and it is often 
limited to description of one person's power over another. In simple terms, it can 
be understood as A has power over B to the extent that he or she can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl 1957 in Lukes 2005:16). Raik et 
al. (2008:731) claim that many discussions of power in natural resources are 
limited to this understanding of power as coercion, mainly because the initial 
model of fortress conservation used coercive means to separate people from 
protected areas.  
Power as constraint or what Lukes calls the second dimension of power is 
exercised by A to suppress the actions or possible actions of B. The argument 
that A can act to constrain the actions of B rests on the idea of mobilization of 
bias (Schattschneider 1960 in Lukes 2005:20). ―Mobilization of bias‖ involves a 
set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures […] that 
operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and 
groups at the expense of others. This view of power also involves both decision-
making and non-decision-making. Making a decision takes place by choosing 
between different modes of action, while a non-decision is a decision made to 
thwart or suppress challenges (latent or manifest) to the values or interests of the 
decision maker (Lukes 2005:21-22).  
Where as decision-making involves a forum where various actors or groups fully 
and equally participate, non-decision-making which is similar to power as a 
constraint occurs when powerful groups prevent the less powerful from being 
involved in the decision-making process. (Raik et al. 2008:733) argue that 
exercising power is not merely a matter of actively controlling decision making, 
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but it can also involve the ensuring of inaction on issues. This view therefore 
recognizes that some institutional procedures systematically organize bias to 
skew the process to benefit the interests of one group over another (Raik et al. 
2008). For instance, power as constraint is involved when particular individuals 
and groups determine what makes something to go into a meeting agenda by 
suppressing undesired alternative views during discussion, or interpreting silence 
as agreement. However to conceptualize power as coercion or constraint, is too 
limiting in trying to understand all of its dynamic and pervasive nature. Both 
views are agent-centred, saying nothing about the social-structural processes that 
shape human relations and interests (Raik et al. 2008). Lukes argues that power 
has a third dimension, where it secures the consent of willing subjects to 
domination.  
In the third dimension, which Raik et al. (2008) call power as consent, power is 
constituted by forces above and external to the individuals. Characteristics such 
as ethnicity, caste and educational background operate silently to influence 
people and their behaviour (Raik et al. 2008). Here, People do not possess power 
individually, whereas power instead stems from structural forces. Those who 
exercise power over others do that because of their position in social structures. 
In this situation, A has power over B when A's behaviour causes B to do 
something B would not otherwise do. Lukes claims that this form of power is real 
and operates in many direct and indirect ways.  
Thus, ―power can be at work, inducing compliance by influencing desires and 
beliefs, without being ‗intelligent and intentional‘‖ Lukes (2005: 136). In 
collaborative resource management, structural views of power that focus solely 
on social structures and ignore individually exercised power are limited in their 
ability to account for agency as they assume that a false consciousness among the 
dominated is created by the social systems (Raik et al. 2008). The subordinated 
local people believe and behave contrary to their true interests as they are also 
seemingly blinded into accepting their role in the existing order of things (Lukes 
2005:28).  
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One shortcoming though, is that this false consciousness is not equally applied to 
all individuals. Minwary (2009) contends that the actions of each player are 
influenced positively or negatively by their perceptions and compliance to the 
laws, rules and regulations. Backman et al. (2001) argue that although definitions 
and models vary, the critical element in collaborative resource management is 
involvement of ‗all stakeholders‘ in the decision making processes, in 
implementing and evaluating the decisions as well as in benefit sharing.  
This is in agreement with the realist view of power sharing in collaborative 
resource management which highlights the importance of social relationships for 
structuring interaction. ―Rather than A getting B to do something B would not 
otherwise do, social relations of power typically involve both A and B doing 
what they ordinarily do‖  (Isaac 1987: 25 inRaik et al. 2008:737). Thus, 
explicitly recognizing and understanding power and its role in natural resource 
management may lead to insights about how natural resource practitioners can be 
strategic in their actions to democratize and equalize asymmetrical power 
relations and improve the practices of natural resource management and 
conservation, especially in cases of decentralisation (Raik et al. 2008:737). 
In chapters four and five of my study, I do apply these power elements in the 
analysis and discussion of my findings on involvement and local participation in 
the three aspects of collaborative resource management at BINP. For instance, 
power is exercised as constraint in decisions regarding multiple resource use and 
revenue sharing at BINP when some individuals or institutions determine what 
and how much is to be given to the local people living adjacent to BINP as 
benefits accruing from conservation. In chapter five while discussing and 
evaluating local participation at BINP in collaborative resource management, I 
find that Power is exercised as constraint and consent when passive local 
participation and ‗silence‘ from the local communities is interpreted as 
agreement for decisions made regarding conservation. 
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2.3 Local participation in collaborative resource 
management 
“At the 2003 world parks congress, it was stressed that protected areas 
should contribute to poverty reduction or at least not increase poverty, and 
that bio-diversity be viewed not only as a national and global resource, but 
also for its contribution to local livelihoods. This therefore calls for an 
urgent need for equitable participation of all key stakeholders in decision-
making, sharing of costs and benefits with particular attention to the needs 
of local communities and disadvantaged groups” (Namara 2006:62). 
Namara (2006) sees participation of local people as a (key feature) for 
collaborative resource management related to protected areas. Such participation 
can be achieved in a range of practices including but not limited to; full 
information sharing, capacity building, benefit sharing, negotiations, full 
empowerment and or transfer of powers as rights to local people rather than 
privileges (Namara 2006; Mannigel 2008). According to Vedeld (2002), local 
participation can be seen as a strategy of devolution of authority and power, 
resources, rights and duties from state to local levels of governance and from 
public to civil society. However, Mannigel (2008:499) contends that although 
participatory approaches are now being employed more frequently in protected 
area management, the underlying goals, objectives and methods used can differ 
greatly. Whereas many actors in conservation today claim to include 
participation as an element of their practices, often this is just rhetoric.   
“…almost everyone now says that participation is part of their work. This 
has created many paradoxes. The term „participation‟ has also been used 
to justify the extension of control of the state and to build local capacity 
and self-reliance; it has been used to justify external decision making; and 
to devolve power and decision making away from external agencies” 
(Pretty et al. 1995:168).  
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Participation is also thought to facilitate social change (Arnstein 1969; Vedeld 
2002; Mannigel 2008), often to the advantage of marginalized groups and 
thereby claimed to ease tensions, conflicts and distrust between local people and 
other stakeholders (Vedeld 2002). In the light of this, the term participation may 
seem ambiguous and susceptible to differing situations, as it can signify different 
goals pursued by the distinct stakeholders (Mannigel 2008).  
Mannigel (2008) therefore suggests two distinct perspectives that can be useful in 
understanding the term local participation in collaborative resource management. 
The first perspective is to use participation as a ‗means‘ to improve the efficiency 
of management interventions, resulting in changes that are sustainable and 
approved by a large number of people. The second perspective is to apply 
participation as an ‗end‘, seen as necessary for equity and empowerment of 
suppressed groups. Mannigel (2008) further explains that, while the perspectives 
are often mixed and not easily distinguished from each other, it is important to 
bear them in mind when analyzing participatory approaches, because 
participation as an end in it self leads to empowerment. Pretty et al. (1995) 
developed a typology of local participation based on seven scales ranging from 
sharing of information to transfer of power and responsibilities (Table 1).  
Pretty argues that in levels A to E, power and total control of decisions belongs 
to other stakeholders than the local people, and most decisions are made prior to 
community involvement. Manipulative participation (A) is the extreme form of 
no local participation. At scales F and G, there is full participation in which all 
stakeholders are involved and self mobilization (G) is the ideal form of total 
participation in which all basics are carried out bottom-up. In these two forms of 
participation local people have power and control and may influence the 
decision-making process. Drawing on Pretty‘s typology, similar scales of 
participation can be found in the literature (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996; Agarwal 
2001; Mannigel 2008). 
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 Table 1: Pretty’s Typology of Participation 
Typology Characteristics of each type 
Manipulative participation 
(A) 
Participation is by pretence. ―People‖ have unelected representatives on 
official boards without power. Almost no interaction occurs between local 
stakeholders and managing institutions. 
Passive participation (B) 
 
People participate by being told what has been decided or has already 
happened. It involves unilateral announcements by an administration or 
project management who do not listen to people's responses. The 
information offered belongs only to external professionals. 
Participation by 
Consultation or 
information giving (C) 
 
People participate by being consulted or by answering questions. External 
agents define problems and information gathering processes. They control 
data analysis. This process does not concede any share in decision making 
and professionals are under no obligation to adopt people's views. People 
have no opportunity to influence proceedings. 
Participation for Material 
incentives (D) 
People participate by contributing resources, e.g. labor, in return for food, 
cash or other material incentives. This is commonly called participation, yet 
people have no stake in prolonging practices when the incentives end. 
Decisions are made by the managing institutions alone. 
Functional Participation 
(E) 
 
People's participation is seen by external agents as a means of achieving 
project goals, especially reductions in costs. People may form groups to 
meet pre-determined objectives. This participation may be interactive and 
may involve shared decision making, but tends to arise only after major 
decisions have been made by external agents. Local people may only be co-
opted to serve external goals. 
Interactive participation 
(F) 
 
People participate in joint analysis, development of action plans and the 
formation, or strengthening, of local institutions. Participation is seen as a 
right, not just as a means of achieving project goals. Formalized decision 
making structures such as management councils involve local stakeholders 
and meet on regular basis. Local people take control over local decisions 
and determine how local resources are used, thus maintaining structure and 
practice. 
Self Mobilization (G) 
 
Local People participate by taking initiatives, independently of external 
institutions, to change systems. They develop contacts with external 
institutions and there is primary transfer of authority and responsibility for 
the resources. 
(Source: based on Pretty et al. 1995 and Arnstien 1965) 
However, I find Pretty‘s (1995) argument that participation should find ways of 
moving from passive or incentive-driven forms to a more interactive form or 
even self-mobilization limited in the sense that it only refers to participation in 
terms of information sharing. Oliphant (1999) notes, participation of all 
stakeholders should not be limited to only information sharing. Whether it is used 
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as a ‗means‘ to achieve an end or an ‗end‘ in itself, a matter of principle, practice 
or both, the issue should be to find out whether it empowers those involved and if 
it makes any difference to those mostly affected by any direct planned 
intervention.  
Borrini-Feyerabend (1996) argues that when using the literal sense of ―taking 
part‖ or ―acting together‖ neither levels A and B nor level G can be considered as 
participatory, as either local people or the institutions are only very distantly 
involved in management and decision-making activities. For instance, when 
participation is seen as a ‗means‘, institutions usually will not share decision 
making authority, and scales E, F, and G are seldom used, while on the other 
hand when participation is considered as an ‗end‘, these latter levels become 
preferable (Mannigel 2008:500). 
Cleaver (2001) observes, participation has become ―an act of faith in 
development, something we believe in and rarely question‖. It is based on three 
main tenets: that participation is intrinsically a 'good thing' (especially for the 
participants); that a focus on ‗getting the techniques right‘ is the principal way of 
ensuring the success of such approaches; and that considerations of power and 
politics on the whole should be avoided as divisive and obtrusive. He further says 
that although all attempts at community based development are well-meaning, 
they are ineffectual. Even though they can be promising, they are inevitably 
messy and difficult, approximate and unpredictable in outcome.   
Although, the translation of some of the conceptual underpinnings of 
participatory approaches into policy and practice in collaborative resource 
management is not necessarily consistent with the desired impacts, the methods 
of participation can still be unrepresentative; which does not mean total 
participatory democracy. Some researchers like (Mosse 2001) and (Nelson & 
Hossack 2003) argue that while participation can be smaller or larger, ultimately, 
power and decision-making remain with the implementing agency and it is at 
best minimal in conservation.  
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Thus, I apply the elements of this normative theory in participation based on 
Pretty et al. (1995) in my chapter five where I address objective two of this study. 
Basing on Pretty‘s typology of participation, I evaluate the participatory forms of 
local people living adjacent to BINP in the decision-making process. This helps 
me to analyse and conclude on whether or not local participation at BINP in 
collaborative resource management aims at empowering local people especially 
in the decision-making processes. Local participation should be an end in itself 
and not a means of attaining conservation goals by simply involving local people 
in the three main aspects of collaborative resource management.  
The next section reviews relevant research findings and claims about 
conservation and collaborative resource management at BINP in Uganda relating 
to management and practice.  
2.4 Collaborative resource management at BINP 
Historically, natural resource management and conservation has been the 
responsibility of the central governments in Africa. However, this strategy has 
not been successful in protecting natural resources and integrating development 
of rural areas. Some scholars show that governments are not necessarily better or 
more successful managers of resources (Gibson 1999).  
Scholars and conservationists currently favour the decentralized community 
based approaches where communities are involved in the management of the 
resources (Caldecott & Lutz 1996). Agrawal and Ribot (1999) define effective 
decentralization as ―the establishment of a realm of local autonomy by 
meaningfully empowering local authorities with decision-making powers and 
resources to act on them‖ (Namara & Nsabagasani 2003:9). Pyhala (2002) 
contends that decentralization improves conservation and managing of natural 
resources because local institutions play a key role in managing eco-systems and 
conserving biodiversity.  
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Despite claims that decentralization yields benefits such as equity, administrative 
efficiency and resource conservation (Namara & Nsabagasani 2003), some 
scholars argue that little evidence exists to justify de-centralization as a 
generalized strategy for effective resource management (Caldecott & Lutz 1996). 
Successful models of collaborative resource management are scarce in 
developing countries, partly because of their complexity and the need for each 
protected area to be assessed on its own in order to determine appropriate 
management strategies. However, as Namara (2006) notes, collaborative resource 
management remains a common approach to protected area management in 
Africa.  
Collaborative resource management is a pluralist approach to managing natural 
resources. It involves some type of partnership of different stakeholders in 
various roles and its end goals are environmental conservation, sustainable use of 
natural resources, the equitable sharing of resources, related benefits and 
responsibilities. Collaborative resource management further seeks to create 
agreements between local communities or groups of resource users and the 
agency with jurisdiction over the resources which are usually under some form of 
statutory authority (Barrow et al. 2001).  
Barrow et al. (2000) claim that collaborative resource management in Uganda 
was as a result of the use rural people made of timber and other non-timber forest 
products which were originally carried out under the customary arrangements of 
forest reserves. Unfortunately under the customary arrangements few or no 
responsibilities were attached to these permit based rights of access, and so the 
system became open to abuse, both by the authorities and local people. As such, 
it became imperative for the government of Uganda to put to practice this new 
phenomenon (Barrow et al. 2000).  
The designation of Bwindi forest reserve as a national park in 1991 brought the 
forest under a new management regime (Namara & Nsabagasani 2003). 
Suddenly, community access to the park and use of its resources was stopped. 
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Entrance to the park without permission from the park management was 
henceforth illegal, as was extraction of any forest resource by community 
members. This led to serious conflicts between the park management and the 
local communities on one hand and park management and local government on 
the other (Mutebi 2003). Barrow et al. (2000) indicate that the reality of 
increasing pressures on protected areas from local communities and the apparent 
impossibility of fending them off using traditional law enforcement practices 
were recognized. Coupled with government support for both human rights and 
the decentralization of power to the grassroots, the ability of the protected area 
managers to ignore the demand of local people weakened. Barrow et al. (2000) 
note that while the previous management policies were highly centralized and 
based on paramilitary policing of wildlife resources, the Uganda Wildlife statute 
of 1996 and consequently the 1999 policy is significantly different in emphasis 
and tone; 
 It obligates UWA to involve local communities and to ensure that 
conservation goes towards rural economies. 
 UWA is obligated to consult through public meetings on the 
development of management plans for protected areas. 
 UWA has to share 20% of its park entry fees with local government 
for the development of communities living around protected areas. 
 The granting of user rights to community groups and individuals 
including; hunting, farming, ranching, trading in wildlife and wildlife 
products, using wild-life for educational or scientific purposes, 
medicinal experiments, development and general extraction. 
Consequently, park management in collaboration with NGOs like CARE 
initiated the joint planning programmes in 1992 which started with the 
formulation of the first General Management Plan (GMP) for the park (UWA 
2001). During its formulation, the communities were consulted on how the park 
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community issues should be addressed to foster development and conservation. 
The negotiations around resource use and access were undertaken in the early 
1990s. These negotiations looked at actual benefits to the local communities and 
the power relations between the community institutions. The negotiations also 
had broader implications in that they began to open lines of communication 
between park authorities and local communities at a time of deep mistrust and 
hostility (Worah 2001 in Mutebi 2003).  
These initiatives also created various entry points for local communities and local 
government to actively participate in the management of the park. The various 
actors and their activities demanded coordination to ensure harmony and a shared 
responsibility in the management of the park. On recommendations of key 
stakeholders, UWA sanctioned the piloting of collaborative resource 
management in BINP starting with a few initiatives, notably the multiple 
resource use initiative (Mutebi 2003).  It is claimed that many local resource 
users attach high value to the fact that they can now enter the forest unchallenged 
by park staff, whereas previously this was an offence punishable by law (Namara 
& Nsabagasani 2003). 
 
2.4.1 Implementation of collaborative resource management at 
BINP  
As part of the statutory process of consulting with communities prior to national 
park declaration, Uganda National Parks (now UWA) was forced to accept that it 
would continue to allow access to forest resources by local people (Barrow et al. 
2000). Consequently, building on the experience of joint forest management in 
India and other more successful stories like the Nepal forest user groups (Borrini-
Feyerabend 1996), a community conservation and development program was 
established with two main objectives. First, it sought the sustainable management 
of park resources through joint efforts of UWA and the local people.  
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Second, it aimed at ensuring that benefits accruing from park conservation were 
shared with the local communities who incur the biggest cost of conservation 
from sharing a boundary with the park. Thus, agreements between UWA and 
community user groups were made to provide for access to certain resources 
within the national Parks as the notion of collaborative resource management 
continued to evolve. Bwindi pioneered various means to share the benefits of the 
national park with its boundary communities.  
The earliest efforts to involve local people at BINP were pioneered by CARE-
Uganda through its Development Through Conservation (DTC) program in 1992 
(Wild & Mutebi 1996). Since then, community conservation and thus the 
involvement of local people at BINP has been a gradual process with different 
elements being introduced using different approaches and at different time 
periods. According to Wild & Mutebi (1996), access to valued plant resources 
for use in both handcrafts and medicine at BINP has helped to support and 
strengthen traditional institutions as well as stimulate the development of new 
ones. 
 However, it is claimed that this arrangement provides a limited number of 
resources to a limited number of people but places a significantly greater 
reciprocal responsibility on the shoulders of local communities, such as 
responsibilities on patrolling for illegal activities, reporting law breakers within 
the community to park staff as well as assisting in extinguishing forest fires 
(Blomley & Namara 2003). On the other hand, an essential and initial step 
towards distributing conservation benefits to the local people was the 
establishment of an effective communication channel, the Community Protected 
Area Institution (CPI) between the park and its neighbours to identify and discuss 
issues regarding sustainable resource management and work towards solutions.  
This Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) system was a result of an 
extensive consultation process aimed at linking the park management team, local 
government and the communities. Formulation of this Community Protected 
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Area Institution presented the first forum for park management and local people 
to meet and discuss problems. It was also a major step forward in mending 
community–park relations as they were allowed to participate in the drafting of 
the first park general management plan (GMP) for Bwindi- Mgahinga which is 
only done every 10 years. Previous park management plans at BINP had been 
prepared either by hired expatriates or by park staff. Thus, they were criticized by 
some scholars for being one-sided because park neighbours were not consulted 
and their views were not addressed (Namara 2006).  
This scenario is also echoed by Goldman (2003) who notes that in most of 
Africa, local communities remain peripheral in defining the ways in which 
conservation is viewed and nature managed. Borrini-Feyerabend and Sandwith 
(2003 in Namara 2006) contend that this is not only unique to Uganda, as it is 
documented that many Protected area authorities in Africa remain unwilling to 
involve local people in genuine partnerships, which involve dialogue, shared 
assessment of problems and opportunities and fair negotiation of decisions and 
actions. Wells and McShane (2004) add that conservation agencies prefer to keep 
local people at a distance.  
This diverts from WCED's definition of participation as ―an active process by 
which beneficiary or client groups influence the direction and execution of the 
development project with a view of enhancing their well being in terms of 
income, personal growth, self reliance or other values they cherish‖. UWA has 
therefore instituted a revenue sharing scheme at BINP that shares 20% of park 
entrance fees with the park boundary parishes. This money should support 
development within front-line boundary parishes that bear the brunt of park 
related problems. As a result of this arrangement, Park management enjoys 
enhanced support for BINP from its immediate neighbours.  
This arrangement, however, makes it the role of the local people to stay out of 
the protected areas in order to preserve biodiversity by accepting compensation 
or development benefits in return. Further still, the park in collaboration with its 
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NGO partners such as CARE, have introduced a small grant scheme to enable 
individual families to generate income to supplement their traditional activities. 
People have been supported in cultivation, agro forestry for firewood, poles, 
rearing animals and projects in poultry, goat keeping, rabbits and bee keeping 
with hopes of reducing the pressure people exert on the fragile park resources 
(Chhetri et al. 2004). UWA also tries to give employment opportunities to the 
local youth living around the park.  
These opportunities include employment as park rangers, guides, porters and 
small temporary contracts such as boundary maintenance and camp cleaning. For 
instance, at BINP over 90% of the employees come from local communities 
(Charles Atuhe, pers.comm.). Despite this, collaboration at BINP is largely still 
perceived by UWA as a privilege delegated to the local communities. Mutebi 
(2003) observes, it is possible for the community members to recognize the 
efforts UWA makes to solicit and improve local participation in the management 
of Bwindi, but they still feel powerless before the Park Management.  
2.5 Summary 
I have presented theories on power and participation in this chapter. I have 
discussed their scholarly arguments in regard to natural resource conservation 
and have also demonstrated their apparent relationship with the concept of 
collaborative resource management. I have also briefly mentioned how I intend 
to use these theories to answer my research question. Finally I have presented 
earlier research findings on the history of collaborative resource management at 
BINP. 
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3. Research Methodology 
3.1  Introduction 
In this chapter I start by providing a description of the research design, including 
the reason for the choice of methodological approach used. Thereafter, I tell the 
reasons why I chose the case of BINP and concentrate the study in Kabale 
District. Furthermore, I introduce the informants and then I describe the methods 
I have applied for data collection. Finally, I discuss ethical considerations for the 
study, as well as the reliability, validity, self reflection and limitations of the 
research.   
3.2  Research Design 
Qualitative research seeks answers to questions by examining various social 
settings and the individuals who inhabit these settings. Qualitative procedures 
provide a means of accessing unquantifiable aspects about people by 
observations and interviews. As a result, qualitative techniques allow researchers 
to share in the understandings and perceptions of others as well as to explore how 
people structure and give meaning to their daily lives (Berg 2004:7).  
In this study, I chose to apply a qualitative approach basing on a single case 
study as a research strategy because I found this to be the best approach to 
answer my research questions on how local people involvement in collaborative 
resource management can be described and evaluated. Yin (1989:23) defines a 
case study as ―an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used”.  
A case study is used as a research strategy in many settings, including political 
science, sociology, organizational and management studies, and city and regional 
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planning research (Yin 1989:13). A case study is often one of the preferred 
strategies when conducting explanatory qualitative studies revolving around 
questions of 'how' and 'why'. This is because such questions deal with operational 
links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence. 
While the historical method is preferred when dealing with the past, case studies 
are preferred when dealing with contemporary events. It relies on many of the 
same techniques as the historical method, but adds two more sources of evidence 
which are: direct observation and systematic interviewing (Yin 1989:18-19). 
Case studies are usually associated with a specific place, community or 
organization in order to shade light on a phenomenon (Bryman 2001).  
I chose BINP as my case because it is considered to be a collaborative resource 
management ‗show case‘ for Uganda since it is the country‘s first park in which 
the idea of local participation in park management was institutionalized (Namara 
& Nsabagasani 2003; Namara 2006). BINP is unique because its aspect of gorilla 
tourism contributes 54% of the total revenue collected from the country‘s tourism 
industry.  
BINP is also an exemplary case of collaborative resource management in Uganda 
because these initiatives have been taken to other parks in Uganda from Bwindi 
(Namara 2006). Namara (2006) argues that BINP is not only the pioneer site for 
this initiative in sustainable resource management, but it has also registered a 
certain degree of success in terms of resolving local people - park management 
conflicts which resulted from its conversion into a national park. Therefore, I 
find it a particular interesting case to see how local people are involved and to 
what extent in these collaborative initiatives at such a resourceful national park.   
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3.3  The area of study and the informants 
3.3.1  Selection of Kabale District as the study area 
Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP) is shared by three districts (Kabale, 
Kanungu and Kisoro) in south western Uganda. I chose to concentrate on Kabale 
district as my study area due to logistical reasons. Here I had the easiest access to 
the park, communities, accommodation and communication. Besides, I am fluent 
in the local language (Rukiga) that is spoken in Kabale; while I do not speak the 
most common language (Rufumbira) used in Kisoro and Kanungu Districts.  
Due to the need to carry out in-depth studies when doing a case study, I had to 
interview a small number of people so as to attain a thick description of the 
phenomenon. Six parishes in Kabale district border BINP out of a total of 23 
parishes shared among the three districts. Since the participatory phenomenon 
under study is a dynamic process which changes over time, I randomly selected 
two parishes (Nyamabare and Mushanje) from the six.  
Two villages were then randomly selected from each parish and my local 
interviewees were also randomly selected from within these villages. Figure 1 
shows a map of the parishes surrounding BINP including my study sites of 
Nyamabare and Mushanje.  
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Figure 1: Location of my sample parishes (Nyamabare and Mushanje) and 
the other parishes that border BINP. Inset is a map of Uganda showing the 
location of BINP. 
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3.3.2 Selection of the informants 
The topic of the study meant that I saw it useful to interview local people and key 
informants from the implementing government authority (UWA), other NGO‘s 
as well as local politicians. As such, my informants were categorized into two 
groups. I selected people living in the villages closest to the park and whose day 
to day activities are related to the park as local interviewees. Key informants 
comprised of UWA staff at various positions. Most of these are from around 
Bwindi while I also interviewed officials at the UWA headquarters in Kampala. 
Furthermore, I interviewed locally elected political leaders and other   
representatives from conservation NGO‘s such as CARE, BMCT around BINP 
as well as members of the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI).  
A total of thirty six interviews were conducted. Ten were with key informants 
and twenty six were conducted with local interviewees from the general 
community. Finding the local people on whom semi-structured interviews were 
conducted was relatively easy as it was a random activity from one household to 
another. However as many as twenty six of the interviewees were male while 
only ten were female. This was the case because most households were headed 
by males who were at home by the time of the interviews while the women were 
away tending to the gardens. Therefore, in order to end up with a reasonable 
number of interviews with women, I actively searched for female interviewees in 
the end. 
3.4  Methods of Data Collection 
This thesis is based on empirical data collected from different sources during my 
fieldwork carried out in the months of November and December 2008. Yin 
(1989) contends that the benefits of different sources of evidence in a study can 
be maximized by following certain principles. If used properly, these principles 
can help with the problems of establishing validity and reliability in the case 
study. First, multiple sources of evidence should be used. This allows the 
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researcher to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, and observational 
issues. Second, a case study database should be created. For case studies, this 
database is likely to be created in form of notes that may take a variety of forms. 
It could be a result of interviews, observations or document analysis, and be 
handwritten, typed, or in form of audiotapes.  
The third principle to be followed is to maintain a chain of evidence. This allows 
an external observer to follow the derivation of any evidence from initial 
research questions to ultimate conclusions (Yin 1989:95-102). Thus in my study, 
I applied various sources of evidence which included previously published 
documents on BINP, the interviews I conducted and participant observation. 
Robson (2002:188) observes, the kind of information sought, from whom and 
under what circumstances determines what method or methods are to be used. 
Since this study sought to explore the practices and perceptions of local people 
involvement in the various aspects of collaborative resource management at 
BINP, I found it necessary to use three different methods of data collection. 
 First, I used secondary documents as a source of information to try and 
understand how participation in collaborative resource management was initially 
intended to be. Secondly, I conducted interviews, both of household individuals 
and key informants to uncover the practices as well as local people‘s perceptions 
on their degrees of influence in the decision-making process. Third, participant 
observation was used as a method to facilitate the in-depth conceptualization of 
the actual participatory processes that go on at BINP, and this also allowed me to 
pursue other new interesting issues that could have been silent in the interview 
process. 
3.4.1  Documents 
According to Scott (in Bryman 2001), when discussing the different kinds of 
documents used in social sciences, distinctions between personal documents and 
official documents should be made. The latter can be further classified in terms 
of private as opposed to state documents. Personal documents can be diaries, 
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letters, and autobiographies, but it can also be visual objects like photography. 
The official state documents are a source of a great deal of information through 
statistical and qualitative information which is based on reasonably large 
representative samples.  
Official documents from private sources include company documents, which 
may be annual reports, policy reports, mission statements, press releases and 
public relations material either in printed form or on the internet. Scott (in 
Bryman 2001:6) further suggests another set of useful distinctions which relate to 
the criteria for assessing the quality of the documents because a lot of questions 
are raised about the reliability and validity of official documented data. Thus, 
four check points have been suggested for this purpose since it is not entirely 
possible to abandon the use of documents in qualitative studies:  
 Authenticity. Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin? 
 Credibility. Is the evidence free from error and distortion? 
 Representativeness. Is the evidence typical of its kind, and, if not, is the 
extent of its untypical known? 
 Meaning. Is the evidence clear and comprehensible? 
In my study the documents I have carefully analyzed are mainly official 
documents from UWA related to the management policies of BINP, such as park 
management plans and policy reports. I have also analyzed previously published 
studies of BINP and newspaper articles.  
I have used these documents to compare and compliment data on the political 
aims and strategies for management of BINP especially, its history, management 
styles, power and participatory processes.  
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3.4.2 Interviews 
Interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a specific purpose of 
gathering information. At least three major categories of interviews may be 
identified: the standardized (formal or structured) interview, the unstandardized 
(informal or nondirective) interview, and the semi-standardized (guided semi -
structured or focused) interview. In the standardized interview, the interviewers 
are required to ask subjects to respond to each question exactly as worded. The 
rationale is to offer each subject approximately the same stimulus so that 
responses to questions, ideally, will be comparable (Bryman 2001).  
In unstandardized interviews, the interviewers begin with the assumption that 
they do not know in advance what all the necessary questions are. They also 
assume that not all subjects will necessarily find equal meaning in like-worded 
questions. The interviewers must develop, adapt, and generate questions and 
follow-up probes appropriate to each given situation and the central purpose of 
the investigation. This will result in questions arising from interactions during the 
interview itself.  
The semi-standardized interview, involves the implementation of a number of 
predetermined questions and special topics. These questions are typically asked 
in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are permitted to probe 
far beyond the answers to their prepared standardized questions. In my study, I 
chose to conduct semi-standardized in-depth interviews in order to gather 
information that would have been difficult to obtain if I had only used 
observation and secondary documents.  
For instance stories told by my interviewees about their participation and 
perceptions on the phenomenon I was investigating. Thus, this became my 
natural method of choice for interviews. Bryman (2001) stresses the importance 
of face to face interaction with respondents because it provides a unique 
opportunity for the interviewer to inquire deeply into the topic of interest and 
explore the complexity and richness of the interviewees‘ opinions, cultures, 
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values, experiences and challenges as they lead their lives. I had a structure and 
was aware of what type of questions I wanted to ask my interviewees, but I was 
also willing to be flexible and let them share with me what interested them most 
or their concerns outside my questionnaire. This meant I had to spend longer 
time carrying out the interviews than I would otherwise have but I was 
comfortable with it.  
First, I felt that it was respectful and it also helped me to maintain an open 
relaxed way of communicating. On an earlier pre-field visit, I attempted to meet 
with a few local people and their leaders such as elders and local council 
representatives in order to create a rapport which enabled my interviewees to 
relax while I conducted the interviews because they began to view me as one of 
their own.  Secondly, I was genuinely interested in understanding the issue at 
hand from their point of view especially with an added advantage of having been 
able to speak the native Rukiga language which we used as the main medium of 
communication. Some few interviews, particularly with key informants were 
however, conducted in English.   
The local interviews lasted between 30 minutes to 1 hour where as interviews 
with key informants took  about 1 hour to 2 hours. I used a digital voice recorder 
to record the interviews of both villagers, key informants of UWA and local 
politicians. The interviews were later transcribed and analyzed. Weiss (1994) 
supports the use of recorders although permission from the informants must be 
sought beforehand. He argues that note taking alone ―tends to simplify and 
flatten informants‘ speech patterns‖ (Weiss 1995:54). I asked everybody for prior 
consent to record the interviews and I assured the interviewees of confidentiality. 
Out of the twelve key informants, three declined to be recorded. I respected this 
view and took notes instead of recording these interviews. 
Later on, I discovered that the recorded interviews provided richer empirical data 
than the three interviews where I had to rely on my notes for analysis. It was not 
easy to recall exactly the interview that I had scribbled down as I struggled to 
 32 
listen, write, guide and also ask questions at the same time. Although Bryman 
(2001) observes that it takes considerably a huge amount of time to transcribe all 
recorded interviews, often using up to six hours of transcription for just one hour 
of audio recording, I found it to be most helpful in data analysis since I did not 
have to struggle in recalling what my interviewees had told me.   
3.4.3  Participant observation 
Bryman (2001) contends, one of the key and yet most difficult steps in 
ethnography is gaining access to a social setting that is relevant to the research 
problem in which one is interested. The way in which access is approached 
differs along several dimensions, one of which is whether the setting is a 
relatively open one or a relatively closed one (Bell 1969 in Bryman 2001). The 
access problem can be eased by assuming a covert role. In this case the fact that 
one is a researcher is not disclosed. Gaining access to social settings is a crucial 
first step in ethnographic research, in that, without access, one‘s research plans 
may be halted in their tracks.  
Bryman (2001) observes that access is not complete when one makes contact and 
gains entry to the group; one also needs access to people because gaining access 
to an organization does not mean that one will have an easy passage through the 
organization. People will have suspicions, perhaps seeing one as an instrument of 
top management or authority. They will worry that what they say or do may get 
back to bosses, colleagues or those in authority especially should the researcher 
interact with them while they carry out ―illegal‖ activities like fetching woodlots 
from the park. If they have worries, they may go along with the research process 
but sabotage it, by engaging in deception and misinformation.  
Ethnographers may attain help from individuals who act as guides and reference 
points with in the communities. These individuals may provide access to the 
group that is to be studied and may become key informants that provide 
information and direct the ethnographer to situations, events, or people likely to 
be helpful to the progress of the investigation (Bryman 2001:292-297). I relied 
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on some key informants from UWA, the local leaders and some local people to 
gain access to local communities, UWA documents and sites. These key 
informants also provided me with information regarding the role UWA plays in 
the management of BINP in our informal discussions which I was able to verify 
through participant observation.  
For instance, in one of the villages neighboring the park, a local guide told me 
that he did not attend UWA-village meetings for participation in the decision-
making process because he considered these meetings to be avenues for the park 
officials to tell the local people what to do and what not do regarding the park 
without meaningful dialogue. I then verified his narrative through participant 
observation at one of the revenue sharing mobilization meetings that I attended 
while in the field. At this meeting, I found out that the meeting had been 
organized by UWA officials and local participation was very minimal since those 
who had attended were quiet most of the time.  
I also attended a meeting with the Human Gorilla conflict resolution group 
(HUGO), a two day workshop in Kabale organized by ITFC on research about 
conservation of Bwindi and other protected areas in the Rift Valley region 
including Rwanda and Republic of Congo where I mostly engaged in participant 
observation. I also participated in Gorilla trekking activities along a 6 km trail in 
the park where I had the opportunity to engage park rangers and porters in 
informal discussions about the phenomenon I was studying. As such, for 
purposes of checking and validating information given by my interviewees, the 
participant observation method became imperative. 
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Figure 2: A photo of the community in one of the village meetings I attended. 
3.5 Ethical Considerations 
Social scientists have an ethical obligation to their colleagues, their study 
population, and the larger society. This is because social scientists go into the 
social lives of other human beings. It is often imperative that the privacy, rights 
and welfare of the people studied must be considered (Berg 2004:43). This 
section highlights the important ethical concerns that were associated with this 
particular study. 
3.5.1  Prior to the Field 
It is ethical and of paramount importance to seek written and certified permission 
to carry out any study. My working title and research instruments had been 
approved by Centre for Environment and Development (SUM), University of 
Oslo.  On arrival in Uganda, the site of the proposed research, I sought 
permission to conduct the study from the Uganda National Council for Science 
and Technology (UNCST), which has the mandate to authorize research to be 
carried out in the country on behalf of the state. Permission was granted to me in 
form of a research permit (Appendix 1).  
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3.5.2  During the field study 
One of the most serious ethical concerns during a field study is the assurance that 
subjects are voluntarily involved and informed of all potential risks. The concept 
of voluntary participation in social science research is an important ideal. On the 
other hand, Berg (2004:58) gives two justifications for not using voluntary 
participants. First, if all social research included only those persons who eagerly 
volunteered to participate, there would be no way of determining if these types of 
persons were similar to others who lacked this eagerness to volunteer. Secondly, 
volunteer subjects may in reality be coerced or manipulated into volunteering as 
respondents in many cases.  
Consequently, research in many public institutions and communities may be 
conducted covertly if it is to be meaningful, but also it is argued that researchers 
must define for themselves what is ethical. However, I clearly identified my self 
to all my informants, explained my topic of study and its purpose prior to the 
interviews. I also tried as much as possible to blend in and become a part of them 
since I did not have an interpreter during my stay in the field.  
3.5.3  Confidentiality and anonymity 
According to Berg (2004), confidentiality and anonymity are sometimes 
mistakenly used as synonyms, but they have quite distinct meanings. 
Confidentiality is an active attempt to remove from the research data any 
elements that might indicate the subjects' identities.  
Anonymity, however, literally means that the subjects remain nameless. In most 
qualitative research, anonymity is virtually nonexistent because the subjects are 
known to the investigators. Thus, it is important to provide subjects with a high 
degree of confidentiality. Names of places in association with a description of 
certain characteristics about an individual may make it possible to discover a 
subject's identity. It is important to always be extremely careful about how one 
discusses one‘s subjects and the settings as well (Berg 2004:65).   
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During the period of this study, I asked the interviewees‘ permission to use the 
information recorded in my final report; they all agreed to this which was a good 
thing. However on probing further, if they would like their names to be revealed 
in the report, all local interviewees accepted and all the key informants preferred 
anonymity. However, the study has some sensitive revelations. I therefore, 
decided to keep all the interviewees anonymous and also to make sure that 
interviews are quoted and referred to in ways that also ensure confidentiality.  
3.6  Validity and Reliability 
Reliability and validity are important criteria in establishing and assessing the 
quality of research for a quantitative researcher, but there has been some 
discussion among qualitative researchers concerning their relevance for a 
qualitative research. It has been argued that reliability; validity and 
generalizability are different kinds of measures of the quality, rigor and wider 
potential of research, which are achieved according to certain methodological 
and disciplinary conventions and principles (Bryman 2001). Writing about 
reliability and validity, Bryman (2001:270-272) refers to LeCompte and Goetz 
who write about the following: 
3.6.1  Reliability  
 External reliability, meaning the degree to which a study can be 
replicated. They suggest that a qualitative researcher replicating 
ethnographic research needs to adopt a similar social role to that adopted 
by the original researcher. 
 Internal reliability, meaning whether members of the research team agree 
about what they see and hear in cases when there is more than one 
observer. 
It is important for the readers of my findings to bear in mind that due to the 
dynamic nature of this study, findings and conclusions depend much more on the 
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type of informants and the existing situation at BINP at the time of the study. 
Nonetheless, the reliability of my study can be contextualized in the rigor and 
meticulous care taken in selecting the appropriate methods, informants and data 
analysis in order to minimize bias. I believe that I have done my best to convince 
the reader that my interpretations are reasonable and supported by the empirical 
data collected. 
3.6.2  Validity 
 Internal validity, meaning whether there is a good match between 
researchers' observations and the theoretical ideas they develop. Internal 
validity tends to strengthen ethnographic research because the prolonged 
time of participation in the social life of a group studied allows the 
researcher to ensure a high level of congruence between concepts and 
observations (Bryman 2001). 
 External validity, referring to the degree to which findings can be 
generalized across social settings. However this may be a problem for 
qualitative researchers because they tend to us case studies and small 
samples. 
In my study, I used a three method triangulation system in order to collect valid 
data. These were documents, interviews and participant observation. My 
intention of using more than one method was to try and minimize the usual 
irregularities, sampling errors and over sights associated with data collected in 
qualitative studies. For example, through the participant observation technique I 
was able to compare and relate data previously collected by the interview 
method; thus internal validity can be claimed in this case. 
3.7 Data analysis 
To analyze the empirical data collected throughout the field study, I started with 
transcribing the recorded audio into a manually hand written format. This 
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involved first writing word by word without change of meaning as recorded 
directly from (Rukiga) the local language to English. The files that had been 
recorded were identified using real names of the interviewees, places of 
interview, time and duration. As mentioned earlier, I had three specific aspects of 
collaborative resource management namely; Revenue sharing, multiple resource 
use and problem animal management and these were the initial categories I used 
during the interviews to solicit local people descriptions and perceptions of their 
participation  at BINP.  
When I had my written transcripts ready, I tried to identify the three main aspects 
in each text by thoroughly reading each interview and writing simple notes on the 
right hand margin about common themes. Later on I realized that there were 
other surprising, interesting and relevant statements that were similar or different 
among the different interviews, especially when I asked them about their 
involvement in the decision-making process. This meant that, I had to make 
copies of interviews with similar perceptions or understandings to form sub-
themes which I color coded that were relevant to the research questions. This 
helped me to further organize and present coherent data relevant to the research 
aim of the study. 
3.8  Self reflection on the field work 
Weiss (1994:128) comments that: 
―The interviewer is a work partner, not a therapist, not a friend, not an 
appraising audience”. 
I had attempted qualitative research before at my bachelor degree level, so I 
assumed that I had quite some experience. However, this study was highly 
explorative in nature, which was a bit different from what I had attempted before. 
During my field study, through the participant observation method and 
interactions with the local people at BINP, the situation became very real to me 
and more often I found myself anxious about the interviews with some of my 
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respondents. Thus, I had to draw a line between what was a formal interview 
during the process and what ―our‖ usual informal interactions were. 
3.9  Limitations 
Prior to the field work, I had carefully read and analyzed relevant written 
documents on the issue of local participation both at the international level and in 
particular on my case study, BINP (mainly Blomley 1994; Fischer 1995; Pretty 
1995; Adams et al. 2001; Cooke & Kothari 2001; Mutebi 2003; Namara & 
Nsabagasani 2003). This created a situation where I felt like I had a fair idea of 
what to expect from my interviewees‘ or at least I thought I did.  
Upon my arrival in the field, I was amazed to realize that my own perceptions 
based on my study of the literature about local participation in collaborative 
resource management were completely different from what my interviewees had 
to say. In such a situation, it is possible to ask leading questions while conducting 
interviews, so I tried hard to refrain from that and to gain as good as possible 
knowledge about my interviewees‘ perspectives.I also up-dated, revised and in 
some instances abandoned the use of my questionnaires in preference for an open 
approach initially inquiring about broad thematic aspects of collaborative 
resource management while probing and guiding the development and 
emergence of questions, theories and explanations through out the interviews.  
Furthermore, fieldwork does not always conform to plan as many other 
researchers will say. During my pilot study, I visited all the three districts namely 
Kabale, Kisoro and Kanungu, where BINP is located. I decided that I would 
conduct fieldwork in at least one parish and one village neighboring the park 
boundary in each of the three districts to have somewhat a representative 
outcome in my findings. Unfortunately, in my pursuit of trying as much as 
possible to fit in the field situation, I fell ill due to the harsh conditions. As a 
consequence, I had to change plans and concentrate the study on Kabale district. 
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This therefore means that the results can not be representative of all the different 
practices and perceptions of local people involvement in collaborative resource 
management around BINP across all of the three clearly distinct districts. 
However, as Yin (1989) puts it, basing on results from one site in which a few 
interviewees are carefully selected enables a researcher to investigate and 
describe the phenomenon as it seems in its actual social setting rather than in a 
laboratory. Thus, the findings of this research based on Kabale district can 
contribute to the knowledge and on-going international and national debates as to 
whether or not local participation in protected area management is actually 
practiced in accordance to the claims of the rhetoric.  
3.10 Summary 
In this chapter, I have argued that the qualitative case research approach is the 
most appropriate choice to answer the research question. More specifically, I 
have shown that it is appropriate in this study to use document reviews, 
informant interviews and participant observation.  
The next chapter presents research findings on how local people at BINP are 
involved in the three main aspects of collaborative resource management.  
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4. Involving local people in the three main 
aspects of collaborative resource 
management at BINP 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present and discuss findings of data collected on the practices 
and perceptions of local people involvement in collaborative resource 
management in Uganda at Bwindi Impenetrable National Park (BINP). The three 
main aspects of collaborative resource management in which local people are 
involved are revenue sharing, multiple resource use and problem animal 
management. I address objective number one by describing each of these three 
aspects in terms of how local people are involved and their perceptions. The 
findings are presented and discussed using theories on power and participation 
from chapter two. I also compare my findings to other researchers‘ conclusions 
from studying the same or similar cases. 
4.2 Aspect one: Revenue sharing 
Scott (1998) holds that to varying degrees and through a range of approaches, the 
sharing of benefits, responsibilities and decision making powers among some or 
all of the stakeholders is the underlying principle of collaborative resource 
management. The Constitution of Uganda specifies for the involvement of all 
stakeholders in the conservation of natural resources. These stakeholders can be 
project financiers, policy makers, implementers, local communities, park care 
takers or managers.  
In relation to this, a key informant working with UWA said that, ―it is enshrined 
in our 1995 constitution that local communities must be involved in one way or 
the other in collaborative resource management initiatives,‖ (Key informant 
UWA). Subsequently, in 1996 a number of conservation institutions and NGOs 
recommended to Uganda wildlife Authority (UWA) to involve local people in 
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the management of the park if natural resources were to be sustainably managed 
for the benefit of the people of Uganda. Among these were conservation partners 
like World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Institute of Tropical Forest 
Conservation (ITFC), International Gorilla Conservation program (IGCP), CARE 
International and the World Bank‘s Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
(Mutebi 2003).  
Following this recommendation, UWA embarked on various collaborative 
resource management initiatives passed under the Uganda Wildlife Statute 1996 
which included revenue sharing and access to forest resources as well as 
providing employment opportunities for the local people as park rangers, guides 
and porters. BINP was the pilot park for such initiatives. One of these initiatives 
is the revenue sharing scheme which heavily relies on park revenue collected 
from the massive gorilla tourism project at BINP. 
 
Figure 3: Photo of a mountain gorilla at BINP taken by researcher.  
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The revenue sharing aspect encompasses two elements of collection and 
allocation of revenues. The element of collection involves first of all the principle 
that 20% of total park entry fees are to be collected by UWA annually and 
remitted to the local communities. Section 70 (4) of the Uganda Wildlife Statute, 
1996 states that ―The Board shall, subject to sub-section (3) of section 23 pay 
20% of park entry fees collected from a protected area to the local communities 
through the local Government‖. In addition, a new scheme known as the ‗gorilla 
levy fund‘ has recently been initiated. In this scheme USD 5 from each gorilla 
trekking permit is to be collected for distribution to the local people. One key 
informant told me the following about the yet to be implemented USD 5 Gorilla 
levy fund: 
The USD 5 issue originated from the realization that the 20% of the gate 
entrance fee which the local people received was too little. Out of the 500 
US dollars the foreigners pay as the gorilla-tracking fee, 30 US dollars of 
this is what is collected as the gate entrance, and the other 470 US dollars 
is collected by UWA as part of its annual income to facilitate other 
activities. So the local people share 20% of the 30 dollars and not of the 
full amount. So we found that, it is quite small. Now the arrangement is 
that the communities will get the additional 5 US dollars from each permit 
added to their twenty percent (Key informant UWA). 
In the element of revenue allocation, the Community Protected Area Institution 
(CPI) at Local Council II (parish level) plays a central role. CPIs are responsible 
for articulating local communities‘ interests in regard to revenue sharing issues to 
both the district and UWA officials. They screen and recommend projects for 
funding within the communities. The CPIs decide on the amount of funds to be 
disbursed per project and when. They also identify what parishes will benefit 
depending on how much revenue sharing funds have been received from UWA 
in a given year. In addition, the CPIs are responsible for monitoring and ensuring 
that revenue sharing funds are not diverted to other programs. 
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Figure 4: A flowchart showing revenue sharing channels among BINP 
communities 
Local Council I (Village level) project committee/households 
 
Local Council II (Parish level) in each of the three districts 
 
Local Council III (Sub-county level) in each of the three 
districts 
                                          Distribution 
A share to 
Kabale district 
A share to Kisoro 
district 
A share to 
Kanungu district 
The total is remitted to UWA offices at BINP – 
Buhoma in Kanungu district 
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fees from BINP 
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tracking permit from BINP 
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offices in Kampala 
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Total of revenue from 
gorilla tracking permits 
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Collection 
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4.2.1 Practices and perceptions 
According to the Uganda revenue sharing policy (UWA 2000), revenue sharing 
in conservation is intended to ensure that local people living adjacent to protected 
areas become positive towards conservation by obtaining benefits from the 
existence of these areas, improve their welfare and ultimately strengthen 
partnership between UWA and the local communities. Furthermore, according to 
information I have received from UWA, the total revenue collected from 20% of 
the park entry fees of BINP alone for the period of the year 2008 amounts to 103 
million Uganda shillings (USD 54, 487). This is to be shared among the 23 front 
line parishes surrounding the park. This means that on average each parish 
receives about USD 2, 275. However, UWA expects an increase in the money 
remitted to the local people starting with this year (2009) as a result of the 
advocacy of CARE-Uganda. It is this NGO that proposed and advocated for an 
additional USD 5 per gorilla trekking permit to be saved in the Gorilla levy fund.  
A key informant from UWA told me that, they were ready to distribute about 298 
million Uganda shillings (157, 642 US dollars) which has been accumulated 
under the USD 5 Gorilla levy fund since 2006 August to June 2008. The three 
districts sharing BINP namely; Kanungu, Kisoro and Kabale will benefit from 
this money. In spite of all this, I found a common complaint among many of my 
local interviewees about the basis of the 20% of the gate entrance fees as revenue 
sharing money remitted to them. The local informants contested this 20% and 
kept on agitating for a substantial increase in this percentage. They told me that 
they were frustrated because their pleas to UWA officials had met a dead end. 
Blomely et al. (2001) observes that the 20% revenue sharing scheme has been 
questioned by many of the local people as well as the fact that it is not received 
regularly (every year) as stipulated in the revenue sharing policy. One local 
interviewee put it this way: 
20% of the gate collection is little, UWA should also give us part of the 
money collected from the people who get licenses to carry out other 
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activities within the park. We also do not receive this money regularly 
most of the time (Interviewee 12). 
Interestingly one of my key informants from UWA seemed to appreciate this 
complaint from the local people that the 20% was too little to be substantially 
shared. He said: 
Our local people argue that 20% of the entry fees seem to be too small. 
That the parks, Bwindi inclusive, should give 20% of the total amount we 
collect. They also say that they are aware that the Gorilla tracking permit 
fees are high especially at BINP. But what they receive is the percentage 
of the gate entrance and not of the total park collection, thus they 
continuously complain that it is too small to be reasonable enough for 
them to share (Key informant UWA). 
I confronted an official from UWA with the opinion I had heard from local 
people that they think the revenues they gain are low. His response to this was 
that their ‗hands are tied‘ because of the Ugandan law that clearly order that just 
20% of the gate entrance fees are to be remitted to local people. This can only be 
changed by a parliamentary review of the current revenue sharing policy. Even 
though UWA may feel the plight of the local people, they cannot do anything 
about the existing 20% from the gate entry fees. However, in spite of the little 
monetary value attached to the 20% revenue sharing, the impression from a few 
local people I interviewed was that they were happy with the communal projects 
that had been realized from this revenue sharing scheme. One of the local leaders 
had this to say: 
We have got a school built out of the revenue sharing money. We only 
provided stones and labor which we were paid for. We also have a 
hospital in Kashasha parish. From revenue sharing, my family and 
relatives applied for a tree planting project and we got the money. 
(Interviewee 12) 
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These types of communal projects like schools, health units and community 
centers were what the local governments at the district level had initially decided 
to use the money for within each parish. However local people that were living 
closest to the park, whose gardens had been frequently destroyed by problem 
animals demanded for a shift from communal projects to individual homestead 
income generating projects. Later on, these types of public revenue sharing 
projects where replaced with a system of allocating revenues to selected 
household projects. I asked one park official in our interview to describe to me 
the process of allocating this revenue to the communities. His response was: 
Specifically for revenue sharing there is no laid down guideline which 
guides how the beneficiaries can be arrived at. As long as these people 
are from within the neighboring parish they are already part of the 
beneficiaries except that on our part we have been encouraging or 
convincing the local officials that their main focus should be on the people 
residing in the very first villages. These are the people who bear the costs 
of conservation most when their crops are damaged by wildlife and it is 
them that waste their time while they are guarding their gardens. (Key 
informant UWA) 
Another key informant also put it this way: 
On previous occasions, we have had problems with this money. Its sharing 
has been surrounded by politics, corruption and nepotism. When we have 
released this money, it has been used along those lines and when we come 
to meet the local people who have worked with us to protect the park; we 
have found that the aim or purpose of this revenue sharing has not been 
achieved. We find people complaining and asking us how they benefit 
from the park. We tell them there is revenue money that UWA shares with 
them. Are you aware of it, we ask? The local people say they are not 
aware of this. (Interviewee 5) 
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When I asked my local interviewees to describe how this revenue sharing was 
implemented in their respective parishes, one respondent said: 
The Local Council committee decides since they know the families affected 
most and those that boarder the park. They can be about 20 families and 
we cannot give the money to all of them since it is not enough. We 
therefore, vote for the families to get the money or the goats. Beneficiaries 
are changed every turn and it is the Local Council II that decides not the 
park officials. (Interviewee 7) 
On the other hand, a few other interviewees gave different accounts of practice of 
the revenue sharing aspect in their villages as below: 
For us from Mukono village what we do is to let people living closest to 
the park be the first ones to receive the revenue sharing money. We mark 
the household were we have stopped giving the goats in the first phase and 
start from there in the next phase. Now, we intend to start from where the 
second phase stopped. (Interviewee 19)  
Another interviewee said to me that, ―In my village it is through a random 
process whereby numbers have been assigned to households and the lucky ones 
have been drawn from a raffle‖ (Interviewee 13). As such, these different 
descriptive accounts reveal that the revenue sharing scheme is marred by 
mismanagement and no clarity on its execution by the Local Councils (LCs) and 
Community Protected Area Institutions (CPI). From this description it seems as 
though there is no proper stipulated mechanism for the distribution of the 20% 
revenue collected from the gate entry fees to the local communities. This may be 
the root cause for the local claims of disorganization, corruption and nepotism by 
members of the Community Protected Area Institutions. 
On another note, UWA tries to address this problem of relying on the inefficient 
Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) system by asking communities to 
spare 10% of the total revenue each parish receives so that the members of the 
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Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) can be facilitated and motivated to 
do their work. UWA also hopes that this would help solve the problem of 
corruption and nepotism by Community Protected Area Institution members. 
This I observed at the village revenue sharing mobilization meeting which I 
attended when a park official reminded the local people of the importance of this 
10% arrangement and requested them to consider it once again. The official said: 
Last year, you remember how you were supposed to receive 3 million 
Uganda shillings (US $ 1,587) but received 2.7 million Uganda shillings 
(US $ 1,428). What do you think caused that? We agreed that 10% of the 
revenue sharing be given to the Community Protected Area Institution 
(CPI) to facilitate their meetings and deliberations. So if you still want 
them to continue deliberating on your behalf, agree to set aside some of 
the revenue sharing money for this institution fund. (Revenue sharing 
mobilization meeting) 
Almost immediately after the park official had made this comment, a Community 
Protected Area Institution member stood up and emphasized this suggestion to 
the local people in the meeting by saying: 
Now, in short what the official has been saying is that if you want us to 
follow up your issues; such as meeting UWA and other park conservation 
partners, we need this money because we cannot go on foot without any 
facilitation. (Interviewee 21) 
Interesting to note is that previous studies on revenue sharing at BINP, for 
example (Namara 2006) claim that according to UWA, the money received by 
the local people is viewed as a small token of compensation to those living in 
areas of massive animal crop destruction. When I mentioned this claim to a key 
informant from UWA, the informant said: 
We feel in a way that revenue sharing came up as a way to compensate 
these affected people because we do not have a legal compensating 
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arrangement. So we still feel that the communities that are directly 
affected should be given first priority when sharing the revenue remitted 
to them. Then the other community members in the parish can come next. 
However we do not have a legal framework for this, so it is just based on 
goodwill. Ideally whether communities are meeting losses or not, they 
should benefit from the revenue sharing scheme but at the moment, they 
are really getting it as compensation of some sort. (Key informant UWA) 
Whether this revenue sharing money is viewed as a token of compensation to the 
local people or not, from my interviews I found that most of my interviewees 
widely acknowledge that the park is quite beneficial to the local people and they 
are optimistic that it will play a significant role in improving their livelihoods. 
Their concern thus is on the magnitude of the money involved and the way the 
scheme is mismanaged by the local officials who are not involving the local 
people in decisions regarding how the revenue share should be distributed 
amongst them. 
4.3 Aspect two: Multiple resource use 
With the declaration of BINP as a national park in 1991, local people were 
restricted from free entry and resource use extraction as it had been between 
1961-1991. This certainly did not go well with the local people who depended on 
these resources for their livelihoods; hence it created conflicts between them and 
park officials.  
The Uganda National Parks (now UWA) therefore devised means of bringing on 
board the local communities as is stipulated in its community conservation 
policy. First, by formulating arrangements to allow bee keepers on a pilot basis to 
resume this activity inside the park. Later on, in 1993, park management at 
Bwindi (BINP) began establishing mechanisms to allow the local people access 
some vital resources like basketry materials and medicinal plants from the park 
that they could not otherwise get from outside. Extraction of bamboo rhizomes 
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and seedlings of indigenous tree species to plant on their farms, access to foot 
paths leading to spiritual and cultural sites was also permitted. This came to be 
known as the ‗multiple resource use‘ aspect (Namara 2006).  
Multiple resource use was therefore seen as an entry point for collaborative 
resource management at Bwindi (BINP) that would reduce on the animosity that 
had erupted, thus improve people-park relations (Mutebi 2003). Consequently the 
park was divided into various resource use zones which are known as ‗multiple 
resource use zones‘. These are tourism areas, plant resource harvest use zones 
and bee-keeping zones.  
 
Figure 5: A map showing multiple resource use zones (MUZs) at BINP 
 
Agreements of involving local people in this aspect were also drawn and these 
are known as ‗memorandum of understanding‘ (MoU). They are signed between 
local people and the park managers. These act as guidelines on how to actually 
implement this aspect of collaborative resource management in natural resource 
conservation. The MoU also specify what resources are to be collected, what 
quantities, how and when. During the field study, I looked through a few parish 
memorandums of understanding and I found out that they specified the kind of 
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resources that were to be harvested, when, where and by what communities or 
groups of people. They also specified the expected responsibilities and duties of 
the different stakeholders.  
Furthermore, multiple resource use just like revenue sharing relies on the use of 
the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI). The main role of its members is 
to liaise between the park and their communities on conservation issues, 
particularly articulating the needs of the communities and their challenges to the 
park officials and providing feedback to the local people. Its membership is 
drawn directly from Parish level (Local Council 2) of the different parishes that 
touch the park boundaries. These members are elected through the local 
government system by the local communities and they are usually one or two 
members representing each individual parish.  
Therefore, in order to describe how local people at BINP are involved in this 
initiative that aims at possibly resolving conflicts between people and park 
authority by allowing them access to certain resources, I interviewed local people 
about the actual practices and perceptions regarding multiple resource use.  
4.3.1 Practices and perceptions 
According to Beck (2000) the pilot parish for this multiple resource use was 
Mpungu parish in Bwindi which was later expanded to include at least about 20 
other parishes around the park with the exception of those parishes that are 
considered to be tourism ‗hot spots‘. My key informants told me that in the pilot 
parish at BINP, sites for collaborative resource management were selected and 
community awareness meetings were held with various groups of stakeholders 
particularly local communities, local leaders, NGO representatives and UWA 
officials.  
These awareness meetings aimed at identifying the potential resource users, 
explaining to them their rights, their role in this process as well as the importance 
of biodiversity conservation. From my interviews with park officials I also 
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discovered that after the sites and users were identified, more focused discussions 
concerning the nature and level of each resource desired by the communities for 
extraction began. For instance, discussions regarding the extraction of bamboo 
rhizomes involved large groups of local people while the use of medicinal plants 
involved smaller groups of mostly traditional healers and local leaders.  
Mutebi (2003) writes that after about nine months of these negotiations, 
discussions and forest resource surveys, the first initiative of multiple resource 
use under collaborative resource management at BINP was formally launched. 
Currently the park is divided into three zones: The ‗buffer‘ zone where the local 
communities have limited access; the ‗tourism‘ zone where the local community 
cannot go; and the ‗core‘ area where there is total restriction of entry to both 
tourists and local people.  
This implies that in some parishes considered to be tourism ‗hot spots‘, some of 
the demands of the local people for resource use cannot be met or satisfied, but in 
areas where there is no tourism, communities can still access basketry materials 
and medicinal plants. One key informant I spoke with on this issue said that the 
problem with these zones was that the communities were greedy and it was easy 
for them to complain about this arrangement especially those who are not aware 
of the different park zones: 
We are not in position to give them all that they want. This is really 
complex, but it is what it is, and in the areas where we have tourism, we 
have suspended the resource access programs. For example, in Buhoma 
and in Nkuringo the local people used to extract hand craft materials from 
the park. When tourism was started we suspended resource extraction. Up 
to this day, there are a few members of those communities who have been 
saying: But why did you stop us from accessing the park while people in 
other places are still free to access? Our response is that, our concern is 
mainly with  gorilla health because in these tourism hot spots once the 
gorillas are habituated they move even closer to communities and this can 
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result into high incidences of human-gorilla disease transmission like 
scabies if we allow people to go there to harvest.(Key informant UWA) 
On the other hand, many of my local interviewees said before the gazettment of 
the park, they were able to earn a living by hunting, honey gathering and gold 
mining with almost no restrictions and little regulations on entrance. Basing on 
this history, some respondents were of the view that they wanted more forest 
resources like firewood, timber, bush pig hunting and wild honey on a more 
regular basis. They complained that what the current arrangements offered them 
was not good enough because they were aware that some of these resources were 
still permissible for extraction by local people in some parishes yet they were 
completely forbidden in other parishes. One village member said: 
When BINP was still a reserve, we used to get a lot of things from there. I 
remember for our mud houses we used to go there and collect bamboo 
sticks for making these houses, but now that is impossible. We have to go 
and buy from someone else who has planted these bamboos. There is also 
restriction on collecting medicinal plants and basketry materials to help 
us make some money, even though these resources are plentiful in the 
park. (Interviewee 11) 
It thus appears that as Hinchley noted back in 1998, that resource use 
negotiations at BINP are based on what and how much the park managers allow 
the forest users to use and that it depends on the park authority‘s (UWA) 
interpretation of what uses are compatible with the park‘s conservation 
objectives. The same situation still prevails even after almost ten years since his 
findings.  
In relation to this, one key informant explained that because of the resource 
inventory surveys by the Institute of Tropical Forest Conservation (ITFC), some 
resources are restricted from community extraction if it is found that they can not 
sustainably regenerate over time.  
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Therefore, communities that would have requested for such restricted resources 
would not actually benefit from multiple resource use zones. He notes that If 
communities are not aware of these resource use inventories that UWA relies on 
to determine which resources and how much can be harvested; they may possibly 
become dissatisfied with the multiple resource use aspect of collaborative 
resource management. He added that although park managers through the signed 
memoranda of understanding are seen by the local communities as prohibiting 
activities that seem to be acceptable uses of the park, UWA cannot act against the 
policies and legislation governing the park.  
When I asked my local interviewees about their feelings towards the signed 
memoranda of understanding, most of them felt that these agreements were 
favoring the park management more than themselves. They told me that they 
were often reminded by the park officials in village meetings that if they did not 
fulfill their responsibilities spelt out in these agreements such as patrolling for 
illegal activities, reporting law breakers within the community to the park 
authority and assisting in putting out forest fires, their rights to resource use 
could be restricted or worse still the resource use agreements revoked. As Mutebi 
noted in 2003, multiple resource use at BINP seems to be largely perceived by 
UWA and other conservation partners as a privilege delegated to the local 
communities. 
 For instance, in one of the pilot parishes it was reported that the park 
management had asked the local people to choose between multiple resource use 
which had been running and gorilla tourism which was proposed to start that 
year. Mutebi (2003) observes, to the poor local people who heavily depend on 
these forest resources, such a position reflects a lack of commitment by UWA to 
multiple resource use as an aspect of collaborative resource management. Related 
to this, previous field reports as well as my own field observations reveal that 
gradually some resource user groups have lost interest in multiple resource use, 
especially those that used to collect basketry materials, and these numbers are 
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still dropping daily. This therefore undermines the actual notion of collaborative 
resource management in sustainable natural resource management. 
From the analysis of my interview responses, I found out that local people feel 
that UWA has disappointed them since they are not allowed to extract and use 
most of their preferred resources like gold, hunting and bamboo collecting. 
Further still, the resources that they are allowed to extract are not in quantities 
sufficient to meet their needs. Other local interviewees complained that they are 
not able to access the park as frequently as before since they are allowed to go 
into the park once or twice a month now in comparison to the past, when they 
would enter the park to harvest medicinal herbs whenever need arose. They thus, 
somehow feel they have been dealt a raw deal through the memoranda of 
understanding.  
Therefore, findings on this aspect of collaborative resource management indicate 
that whether or not resource use preferences are approved, it is crucial to the 
process that local people as stakeholders are given a reasonable consideration of 
their suggestions rather than an outright unexplained dismissal. As Beck (2000) 
notes, although collection of basketry and medicinal materials is certainly 
appreciated by some local people, it is not likely to be enough to make all people 
content because the products they really demand like gold, timber and cultivation 
rights are still restricted within the national park. My observation at this point is 
that the outcome of involving local people in the multiple resource use aspect at 
BINP this far has therefore been a provision of a limited number of resources and 
to a limited number of local people.  
4.4 Aspect three: Problem animal management  
Problem animal management is an important concern among many of my 
interviewees who are local people living around BINP. This is also one of the 
three main elements of collaborative resource management. In this aspect local 
communities are involved in direct interventions of problem animal management 
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in partnership with UWA. At BINP, there is a clear boundary dividing the 
communities from the national park as a result of the 1991 transformation of the 
forest reserve into a national park.  
Therefore, this implies that local communities are expected to respect this 
boundary by cultivating only in the land bordering the park. While the 
communities do not have much access  to the national park, the over 120 species 
of mammals, 10 species of monkeys, bush pigs and baboons, in addition to the 
gorillas, do not always keep inside these park boundaries. Thus the animals 
sometimes feed on local people‘s gardens, especially in the buffer zones. 
Consequently, this has led to massive crop damage, property destruction and at 
times people have got injured. 
 
 Figure 6: Clear park boundary from cultivated plots of land at BINP 
 
From my interviews with local people, problem animals are described as a real 
menace to them when they destroy their crops. This is aggravated by the fact that 
there is a high population density and shortage of agricultural land, thus a 
considerable amount of additional costs to people‘s modest livelihoods. One 
elderly local interviewee told me: 
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Before the park was gazetted we used to hunt for meat in the forest 
reserve. We also used to collect basketry materials and fruits from the 
park. We have now been stopped from hunting, so we entirely depend on 
the crops we plant for food. However, now animals, like elephants, 
monkeys, baboons and bush pigs have started destroying our gardens thus 
making it impossible for us to have sufficient food in our households. 
(Interviewee 22)  
4.4.1 Practices and perceptions 
My interviews with local people indicate that many local inhabitants are sad 
about the fact that there is no clear compensation method for damaged crops, 
property or human injury. In a discussion with one key informant, I asked him to 
enlighten me on the issue of ‗no compensation‘ as had been reported by the local 
communities. He said, ―the wildlife policy and law in Uganda does not specify 
for compensation in regard to crop raids, property destruction, human injury or 
even death‖. Nevertheless, Community members feel that UWA has not 
accorded this issue of problem animals the attention it deserves (Namara 2006). 
In an interview with another key informant about the same issue, he said: 
There is a general feeling from the local communities that UWA has not 
done much in helping them put-up problem animal control interventions. 
The local people reason that UWA officials are collecting lots of money 
from tourism hot spots and at least part of that should either be used to 
construct a perimeter fence around the park, maybe hire people to guard 
the gardens or even compensate them when they incur losses. So, on that 
issue they feel that UWA is not really being concerned about them, and we 
sincerely try to tell them that we collect money but it is not enough to 
sustain the operations of UWA, revenue sharing scheme as well as 
compensation. (Key informant UWA)  
Furthermore, the issue of problem animals is compounded in some instances 
where people‘s lives, crops and property are damaged or threatened by species of 
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very high conservation value like gorillas. The habituation of gorillas has made 
them less fearful of proximity to humans, thus they spend most time in people‘s 
gardens within the buffer zones from where they are usually viewed by tourists 
(Namara 2006). When I spent one morning tracking gorillas with other tourists at 
BINP, I observed that the gorillas we visited were actually not located inside 
BINP, but in the gardens of the local people within the buffer zones. One Local 
Council (LC) representative in one of the villages I visited told me that: 
We have asked UWA that since gorillas have come closer to us, will they 
not kill us. They replied that they cannot compensate for the loss of a 
human being because it is too expensive. Thus, if I kill a gorilla, I am 
imprisoned, but if the gorilla kills me, nothing happens. This is not good. 
(Interviewee 4) 
While in the field, I discovered that some community members have moved 
away from the front line villages bordering the park. I also observed that for 
those who are still living along the park boundaries, their common strategy to 
handle the problem is to use children to guard crops, especially during the day 
time and in the peak of the crop raiding season. These children cannot go to 
school. The result seems to be that there are high levels of school drop-outs in 
these areas. This may escalate the incidence of poverty within these 
communities. A young villager told me his own experiences with this: 
I could not go to school anymore because the crop raiders were disturbing 
us, and I was spending a lot of time guarding against them. For example, 
we plant our seasonal crops around August. In November and December 
when it is time to sit for end of year school exams for promotion to 
another class, that‟s when the baboons do a lot of havoc in the fields, and 
my parents would make me go guard against the animals instead of going 
to school. So I dropped out of school. (Interviewee 11) 
However, according to UWA officials, they are trying to solve the problem of 
crop raiding by advising communities to plant thorny Mauritius (Ceasalpina 
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decapitela) hedges, locally known as ‗omukwatagwe‘ in Rukiga. Furthermore, 
scare shooting and trench digging are recommended. Red chili is also planted by 
the local people along the buffer zones, and noise is made to keep the animals 
away. These interventions are viewed as a two way kind of cooperation between 
UWA and the local people through agreements signed specifying their different 
roles regarding problem animal management.  
We have a two-way collaboration in terms of problem animal control. We 
have agreements signed for the local people to work towards establishing 
interventions to control animals coming out of the park. We all try to work 
together. The communities make their own input by planting Mauritius 
thorn hedges along the boundaries. Other local people are voluntarily 
moving away from planting their traditional crops to non-traditional in 
order to live in harmony with the wildlife while others are planting red 
chili which they later burn for purposes of scaring the elephants away. 
(Key informant UWA) 
However, this has not been easy according to a key informant from UWA. Local 
people find these interventions very laborious, thus they want UWA to do the 
work and maintain it as well. Another UWA respondent mentioned that for the 
elephants which largely destroy local people‘s gardens, they are yet to introduce 
the use of grease and a high level perimeter wall which has reportedly been 
successful in the Kenyan national parks.  
However, at the moment UWA is constrained by monetary funds as well as 
human capital. He also noted that some local people have complained that UWA 
officials are reluctant at responding to calls from communities when they are 
attacked by the problem animals. He attributed this situation to the fact that 
UWA is under-staffed such that they cannot be effectively present in all areas at 
the required times. But this should not to be interpreted as a lack of concern 
towards the local communities. 
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Another mechanism UWA has deployed to try solve the problem of crop raiding 
is to buy land from local people living within the buffer zones and are willing to 
sell. This implies that the local people who sell off their land, move to other areas 
and buy some smaller pieces of land for cultivation. Although, this seems to be a 
quicker and easier solution under collaborative management agreements, to most 
local villagers, it is inconveniencing due to acute land shortage and 
fragmentation in over populated Kabale District.  
Furthermore, People find it difficult to find land to buy near their homesteads. 
Instead they have to walk almost half a day to go cultivate their gardens in other 
places if they manage to buy some pieces of land somewhere else. Namara 
(2006) also criticizes the way the selling and buying of land was done. She 
claims that the legally aware UWA officials hired the assessors and surveyors 
which led to UWA determining terms of land sale and purchase. She also notes 
that, this implied that the local people did not have enough information necessary 
for them to consider all possible options of maximizing value out of their land. 
They were therefore, unequal but willing partners in this transaction.  
Some of my local interviewees that had agreed to sell their land to UWA due to 
escalated crop damage by problem animals claimed to have done so because they 
had no alternative. Keeping it would still prove useless to them when the 
problem animals raided all their crops or if the cost was to keep their children out 
of school so as to guard the gardens. However, according to key informants from 
UWA, in most instances the communities agreed to voluntarily surrender their 
land to UWA in order to create buffer zones so as to control the problem animals 
from raiding their gardens. One park official mentioned that the local people had 
been duly compensated for their land in monetary terms. He said: 
In the areas of Nkuringo, we have communities which freely gave up their 
land for purposes of creating a buffer zone between the community and 
the park. They didn‟t sell it to us, but eventually we had to compensate 
them because someone is not going to move away without knowing how to 
 62 
re-establish himself. He may have the will but he must have a living 
wherever he goes. So we did put in some „coins‟ in their hands, although 
these „coins‟ are not equivalent to the land they gave up. (Key informant 
UWA) 
Basing on theoretical perspectives of power and participation in conservation, the 
above findings show that the system of land valuation, sale and purchase at BINP 
as a problem animal management intervention is characterized by unequal power 
relations, thus there is need to involve local people in these negotiations and 
transactions in a more transparent, fair and equitable way if they are to appreciate 
conservation efforts. 
4.5 Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented and discussed my findings regarding objective 
one of my study. I have also used direct quotations from my interviewees to 
illustrate the practices and perceptions on local involvement in revenue sharing, 
multiple resource use and problem animal management. Relating these findings 
to theories on power and participation, this study makes a lot of interesting 
revelations about how local people are involved in conservation at BINP and 
here are my conclusions.  
This study shows that involving local people in the three main aspects of 
collaborative resource management varies widely due to a number of reasons as I 
have discussed in this chapter. Some local people are not willing to take part in 
collaborative resource management initiatives under the existing agreements and 
provisions at BINP. They feel that power belongs to a group of people especially 
their elected representatives who have ultimately misused and abused it in form 
of being corrupt and ineffective when it comes to benefit sharing.  
For instance, results reveal that although local people are involved in the revenue 
sharing aspect as beneficiaries of the 20% of the gate entry fees, this aspect is 
still marred by a few hiccups. This has led to a feeling of dissatisfaction on the 
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part of the local community members regarding its implementation and 
execution. Most of the local people I interviewed felt that receipt of economic 
benefits does not necessarily reflect their active participation in collaborative 
resource management.  
On the other hand, those that are involved in these initiatives do so because they 
expect some form of tangible benefits, which may or may not be necessarily a 
reflection of their interest in improved conservation. Thus, a clear commitment 
by UWA and other conservation partners to the articulation and consideration of 
local peoples‘ interests in the decision-making element of collaborative resource 
management is needed. 
In the case of local people access to park resources and which resources can be 
harvested, resource use agreements between UWA and communities need to be 
reviewed basing on cost-benefit park evaluations in which the ecology of the 
protected areas and the impact of these resources on local people livelihoods are 
determined before decisions are made. 
Regarding the aspect of problem animals which many of the interviewees 
reported as the most pressing conservation cost to their livelihoods, the 
government of Uganda through UWA should develop a policy to address the 
‗compensation‘ issue in case of human injury and death resulting from wildlife. 
The next chapter presents an evaluation of local participation in the decision-
making process at BINP basing on Pretty‘s (1995) typology of participation. 
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5. Local participation in decision-making at 
BINP  
5.1 Introduction 
Empowerment of local communities is presented as an important aspect of 
collaborative resource management in Uganda. Some scholars argue that local 
people involvement in decision-making may have positive effects in resource 
conservation by bringing about a sense of responsibility towards nature.  
In this chapter I first describe and then evaluate my findings on what 
arrangements are in place at BINP to allow people to participate in decision-
making. Drawing on the theory I presented in chapter two on power, I provide 
findings about what type of actors in the communities tend to have or not to have 
a say in park management decisions as well as the type of decisions involved. I 
use Pretty‘s scale of participation as a comparative tool for my evaluation of how 
local people participate in decision-making in the case of BINP.  
5.2 Involving local people in decision-making 
processes at BINP  
In 1994, UWA in partnership with other conservation stakeholders at BINP 
started working towards involving local people in the management of the park. 
Their argument is that this was envisioned to minimize conflicts between park 
managers and local communities over the creation of the park. This implied a 
broader picture of involving people in benefit sharing through the revenue 
sharing scheme, allowing them access to resources within the multiple use zones, 
and an active involvement in deciding on issues of park management. Through 
the provisions of the 1995 Uganda Constitution and the 1997 Local Government 
Act decentralization was officially embarked on in Uganda. This led to the 
devolution of broad powers of administration and implementation to the local 
governments known as districts, leaving the central government with 
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responsibility for matters of defense, and law and order. Local governments were 
mandated to meet with the local people, discuss with them and jointly make 
decisions regarding development of their local areas.  
The leaders of local governments are democratically elected by the people they 
lead and represent the electorate in deciding on some issues and are, at least in 
principle, accountable to the electorate. Since it is through this local government 
that the local people are involved and are supposed to participate in making 
decisions regarding BINP, below I elaborate on the structure of the local 
government and how it goes about involving people in deciding on management 
issues before I give my evaluation as to whether the local people involvement 
observed at BINP translates into local participation, particularly as defined by 
Pretty.  
5.1.1 The local government structure in Uganda 
In Uganda there are five administrative levels of decision–making within the 
local government system (Table 2). The village constitutes the first and lowest 
level (Local Council I), followed by the parish (Local Council II), the sub-county 
(Local Council III), the county (Local Council IV), and finally the district (Local 
Council V). Although parishes are made up of several villages (LC I) which 
often are seen as the smallest units of a community, the local government defines 
the parish (LC II) as the lowest level representing a ‗community‘.  
Local Council I, also known as the village level consists of officially elected 
representatives under the Local government Act 1997. At this level, local people 
are invited by Local Council I chairpersons to village meetings. These meetings 
are usually called to address simple village level conflicts like domestic violence, 
theft and disease outbreaks.  
Local Council II (Parish level) also consists of directly elected local government 
representatives. Through a democratic system of elections, every five years, local 
people cast votes in favor of those nominated to be their representatives. At this 
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level there is also the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI), whose 
membership is drawn from the parish representatives. It is stipulated in the 1997 
local government Act that the village secretary for production at local council I 
becomes a member of the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI). Thus, a 
secretary of production is appointed by the local council II executive committee 
for each parish bordering the protected area and together they form the CPI 
committee at Local Council III level.  
Local Councils III (Sub-county), IV (County) and V (District) all consist of 
democratically elected local representatives under the Local government Act of 
1997. However, these three levels are mainly concerned with making 
administrative decisions regarding the implementation of the general District 
development plans on behalf of the central government unlike the parish level 
(Local Council II), the Parliament and UWA where most specific conservation 
related decisions are made. The Parliament that comprises of constitutionally 
elected members who represent the interests of their electorates at the highest 
decision-making structure is at the helm of the five local council levels.  
Local government elections just like parliamentary and presidential elections are 
supposed to be held every five years according to the 1995 Constitution of 
Uganda. However, the last local government elections were held in 2001 almost 
eight years ago because due to financial constraints and political reasons, the 
government of Uganda did not organize local council elections when it held the 
2006 presidential elections.  
5.1.2 Local government and local participation in decision making at 
BINP 
In regard to making decisions relating to Protected Areas such as Bwindi, the 
local government works hand in hand with UWA, the managing authority of 
parks and protected areas in Uganda. At each administrative level in the local 
government structure, different activities and types of decisions are made (Table 
2).  
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Table 2: Decision-making levels in Uganda regarding conservation 
Decision-making 
structures  Activities and decisions made 
The Parliament of 
Uganda 
 Passes bills regarding natural resource management. For example, the decision 
to share 20% of gate entry fees with local communities.  
 The wildlife statute of 1996 which provides for community participation in 
conservation was also passed by Parliament.  
Uganda Wildlife 
Authority (UWA) 
 Mandated to collect revenue from park activities like tourism.  
 Obliged to remit 20% of the park gate entrance fees to the local communities 
living adjacent to the park.  
 Decides on which resources can be extracted from the park, when and how 
much. 
 Obliged to work with communities in solving the issue of problem animals. 
Sub-county level (LC 
III) 
 Mandated to receive revenue sharing money (20%) from UWA and distribute it 
among the different parishes bordering the park. 
 Obliged to monitor proper use of the money and report to UWA. 
 
Parish level (LC II) 
 Obliged to provide an avenue for local people living adjacent the protected area 
to present their interests, concerns and suggestions to park management.  
 Provides avenues for discussion and negotiation on benefit sharing programs.  
 It also screens, decides and selects parish level projects to be funded under the 
UWA revenue sharing scheme. 
Village level (LC I) 
 UWA utilizes the representatives on this level to warn the local people about 
the consequences of poaching, trapping animals and illegal entry into the park. 
 Obliged to inform people to write project proposals in anticipation of the 
revenue sharing money. 
 
Table 2 shows that, the Parliament of Uganda is the highest decision-making 
level, followed by UWA the managing authority of parks and protected areas in 
Uganda. Then the other local government structures are shown in descending 
order of power and administrative authority from Local Council IV (District) to 
Local Council I (village level). 
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Local interviewees at BINP told me that the extent and nature of their 
involvement in decision-making processes varied between the different aspects 
of collaborative resource management and that different local government levels 
were involved in each aspect. 
The aspect of revenue sharing 
Decisions regarding the aspect of revenue sharing in Uganda can be seen to be 
made at least at two levels. First, revenue sharing as a policy and the stipulation 
that 20% of the gate fees be remitted to local communities living around BINP 
was made at the parliamentary level. From my interviews, any deliberations on 
this have to be made at the same level. Whereas park management officials 
consistently mentioned to me that they realize that the 20% of gate entrance fees 
may be a small amount to be shared among the communities, they tended to 
regard this as a matter of policy over which they have no direct control.  
On the contrary, some local interviewees argued that they know UWA draws up 
the policy discussions, drafts them and submits them to parliament for review 
and final passing into law. When I asked them as to why they could not influence 
UWA to draft favorable suggestions or recommendations to parliament, one 
interviewee said; ―we are presumed a marginal illiterate community living at the 
edges of a national treasure, so we have no effective voice to influence such 
decisions‖ (interviewee 12). Despite their pleas, complaints and suggestions, the 
20% of the total gate fee as revenue sharing which was decided upon by the 
Parliament of Uganda almost ten years ago, has not been reviewed. This implies 
that local people at BINP have no influence on decisions made such as how 
much revenue sharing money is remitted to them from UWA. 
Secondly, UWA is required to channel the local people‘s share of the park 
revenue through the local government structure. The local government, 
particularly through the Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) is in 
principle supposed to agree with the local people on how this revenue can best be 
used. The Uganda revenue sharing policy (UWA 2000) states that decisions 
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regarding which projects are to be supported by revenue sharing money shall rest 
with the local people through the Community Protected Area Institutions (CPIs). 
However at BINP, this revenue was initially used to fund communal projects like 
schools, health units and community centers as I have earlier shown, and 
according to my local interviewees, these decisions were made largely by the 
local government. And key informants could testify to this. For example, one told 
me the following:  
In theory the communities are supposed to be the ones to come up with 
what they feel they want to use the money for. But initially the Local 
Council officials were influencing how the money would be utilized. In 
fact, we had a very serious case last year. The LC II chairman wanted the 
money to go towards working on the road that led to his home and the 
local people wanted something else. So he said that if this money is not 
going to be used for part of this road, he would not sign their other project 
proposals. Indeed, he refused to sign these project proposals until when 
UWA intervened. (Key informant UWA) 
Due to such complaints from the local people, UWA moved from funding 
community projects to individual household projects. As I have mentioned 
earlier, here the local people write individual proposals that they submit to their 
Community Protected Area Institution representatives (CPI). These 
representatives, in consultation with the local people are then supposed to decide 
on what projects to fund. But, local people hold that these representatives do not 
consult them and instead make own decisions.  
As such, local people seem not to have power to decide on what projects are to 
be funded or the beneficiaries. Apart from relying on locally elected 
representatives for participation in decision-making at BINP, local community 
meetings are supposed to be used as avenues for some form of local participation 
in decision-making. However, my local interviewees view these meetings that 
UWA and other actors rely on to involve them in some form of dialogue as 
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simply avenues to air their grievances such as on the issue of problem animal 
management. One local interviewee said: 
We do not usually attend meetings when there is no problem to discuss. 
We only meet when there is a community issue to discuss. We do not come 
to these meetings because we know that there is no benefit from the 
meetings. Otherwise, usually these meetings are organized to inform us of 
what to do or not to do regarding park management (interviewee 7). 
This I also observed at one revenue sharing mobilization meeting that I attended. 
One of the park management officials started the meeting by announcing that the 
main purpose of the meeting was to warn the people of what would happen to 
them if they insisted on illegally accessing park resources. He further said that 
park rangers may shoot these trespassers if they continued to do so after this 
warning. This resonated with claims from local interviewees that local 
community meetings were avenues for receiving instructions and warnings from 
UWA and therefore largely time wasting.  
These findings are in agreement with Beck (2000) whose research in Kanungu 
district revealed that most people perceive such meetings as events where local 
people are to be taught the rules regarding park management. A few other village 
informants told me that they were not even aware of such meetings in their 
villages, and that they usually hear that meetings about the park are only for 
committee members. Personal field observations reveal that communication 
between Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) members and local people 
in regard to decisions about who benefits and distribution of the revenue each 
parish receives from the Sub-county level seems often to be limited. In regard to 
my findings about poor communication channels and information sharing with 
the local people, I asked one key informant from the Community Protected Area 
Institution (CPI) to comment on this revelation and this is what I was told: 
Truthfully, we have no avenues to meet the local people. I have nothing to 
give the people. People are spoilt now and they want money for attending 
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meetings. So I try to use the available avenues, like church services, or I 
ask the chairman to make village mobilizations, or when he meets his 
people in the village, I ask him to create time for me to talk to the people. 
But I cannot call my own meetings. These days when you invite someone 
for a meeting, they ask you if there is lunch, and if you say no, then they 
will not come. You will not find people in meetings; you have to find them 
where they are gathered without forcing them. (Key informant CPI) 
However, local leaders are aware of local peoples‘ reluctance to attend meetings. 
One local leader told me that local people may complain, but he was certain that 
they did not attend meetings because they were of the view that these meetings 
were time wasting especially if there were no tangible benefits. When I 
interviewed another local informant about this sentiment, he said that in general, 
participation in these communal meetings was mostly by those few lucky ones 
who had reason to expect some benefit. Most of my local interviewees claimed to 
have very limited influence on the final decisions, thus saw no much reason for 
attending the meetings.  
At two separate village (LC I) meetings I attended, I particularly observed that 
few women attended the meetings compared to the attendance of men. This 
reflected that women at BINP were less involved in conservation issues 
especially decision-making processes because in Uganda, due to cultural and 
social constructions, men are considered to be the decision-makers. Furthermore, 
decisions passed at this meeting I attended were based on majority votes by show 
of hand. Such a method of open voting without anonymity may hinder 
democracy as local people may be coerced into raising their hand up in favor of a 
decision they would not other wise have agreed too simply because they are 
afraid of the repercussions from other community members or authoritative 
leaders present in the meetings.  
Although, some local people around BINP told me that they appreciated the fact 
that these meetings provide some form of dialogue with the park managers, 
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compared to the alternative of no dialogue at all, as it used to be in the earlier 
days, I observed that the majority of local people who attended the meeting were 
passive, offering limited or no input into the proceedings. As such, most of my 
local interviewees told me that many of the local people still seem to be 
dissatisfied. They continue to feel that they have no power to make or influence 
park management decisions.  
The aspect of multiple resource use 
In the aspect of multiple resource use, I was told that local people usually within 
their resource use groups sign agreements with UWA detailing which resources 
can be accessed, in which parts of the park, and in what amounts. With this 
access, the local people as ―co-managers‖ are reportedly expected to take up 
some responsibilities such as monitoring and control of the level of product use 
to park management, but also reporting ―trespassers‖.   
As many of my interviewees narrated to me, it is park management that makes 
most of the decisions in this aspect as well. The local people are asked what they 
would want to access from the park and management decides what is acceptable 
and what is not. Consequently, local people claim that access to the resources 
―they really want‖ is not guaranteed. As I found out in my interviews, park 
management is aware of these sentiments from local people, but they maintain 
that they are not in position to meet all the local demands and preferences.  
Another local interviewee told me that when UWA officials ask them what they 
want to extract from the multiple use zones, they mention gold, timber and 
hunting as their top three priorities. As I have earlier shown, UWA does not 
allow any of these activities to take place in the resource use zones. Local people 
are only allowed to extract basketry materials and medicinal plants, which are 
ranked in the lowest positions on their preference lists. Thus, local people 
complain that their requests, preferences and suggestions are never considered 
hence they have no influence on decisions that are important to them. An elderly 
village member had this to say: 
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When we say something and it is not implemented, such as the forest 
resources we wish to extract, we lose trust because we realize that our 
pleas are not considered and we have no say. When we mention our 
suggestions to UWA officials, they never say they have not heard us; in 
fact they assure us that they will communicate with other top officials and 
give us feedback. Unfortunately they usually tell us that our suggestions 
are not possible because there is no law for it or UWA cannot accept this 
and that. (Interviewee 4) 
As a result, I can say that not many resource users are currently interested in the 
multiple resource use zones. The only notable exception is a group of 
beekeepers. The local people feel that park management listens to this group as 
the group continues access the park even when others were stopped and also 
continues to benefit from the support of park related interventions such as the 
International Gorilla Conservation Programme (IGCP) that is helping this group 
process its honey and find competitive markets. However, as one leader of a bee 
keepers association told me:  
It so happened that some bee keepers helped the park back in the days 
when some people were trying to destroy the forest by fire. The bee 
keepers used to go there and stop the fire because they had some bee hives 
there. And the park authority saw it important to leave the bee keepers to 
continue with the activity because they were helpful. Even then, unlike 
other users they were not collecting or destroying any resources. They 
also help in informing the park authority if some people are sighted 
setting snares in the park (Interviewee 16). 
Overall, my findings here are in coherence with Hinchley et al. (1998) who made 
similar observations from Mt. Elgon National Park, that the collaborative 
resource management agreements that had been drawn between some 
communities in the pilot parishes around the park and UWA did not provide for a 
strong mechanism of providing local communities with influence in decision-
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making, rights and responsibilities. The negotiation process of participatory 
agreements was dominated by UWA staff. UWA set most of the provisions 
basing on what was acceptable to them, rather than establishing a devolvement of 
decision–making authority to the local communities. Consequently, local people 
are not able to influence management intentions and decisions regarding park 
use. Over a decade, the situation is the same. 
The aspect of problem animal management 
Problem animal management is one aspect of collaborative resource management 
where local people are believed to be equal partners by UWA in decision –
making and responsibility sharing regarding park management. However, 
according to my local interviewees, UWA makes the decisions by deciding on 
what methods the communities are to adopt in order to control problem animals. 
Before the establishment of BINP, local people could enter the forest in order to 
kill or trap the vermin or problem animals. This was a local way of controlling 
the numbers of animals as well as reducing the eventual costs of crop raiding, 
property damage and other social costs like children dropping out of school. 
Today it is illegal to apply control methods not approved by UWA, such as the 
use of snares. Local people are only allowed to chase the animals from their 
gardens up to the forest boundaries and not beyond that point. A female 
informant told me about this the following way:  
We used to chase animals deep into the forest, now we only get to the 
boundary and they reappear. When the wild animals destroy the gardens, 
you cannot chase them and kill them. If you do, the rangers may kill you 
too (Interviewee 8). 
Further discussions and interviews on this aspect revealed that the local 
communities had eventually organized themselves into small groups, comprising 
of mainly men, known as the Human-Gorilla Conflict resolution groups (HUGO) 
who are responsible for chasing the gorillas away from people‘s gardens. HUGO 
members are not employed by UWA. Instead HUGO is a voluntary arrangement 
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under collaborative resource management that was initiated when the local 
people realized that they could not be allowed to hunt and kill the problem 
animals like before when it was a forest reserve. 
While in the field, I attended one HUGO member meeting in which I had an 
opportunity to further understand their involvement and participation in the 
aspect of problem animal management and decision-making at BINP. I was told 
these HUGO groups do not have a right to make decisions on what interventions 
are to be used. Their duty is to inform UWA park rangers where the problem 
animals have been sighted in addition to carrying out regular patrols in the front 
line villages. Thus, although such an initiative among local park inhabitants 
could possibly signify a better understanding of the importance of wildlife by the 
local people as well as improved relations with UWA regarding conservation 
efforts, it is clear that local participation in decision-making processes at BINP is 
still limited to those with power and authority. 
5.3 Evaluating local participation in decision-making at   
BINP 
Participation in decision making may involve the sharing of responsibilities 
along with some rights and benefits, but it does not at all provide full control on 
park issues to the local people. Its aim is to gain the full support of people to 
conservation, and also to empower them in ways that they are able to influence 
park related decisions or make these decisions on their own. Participation may 
have different qualities connected to it for different people in different situations 
depending on whether it is seen as a ‗means‘ or as an ‗end‘ in itself.  
Much of the literature on local participation in collaborative resource 
management in developing countries dwells on how local communities are 
involved in the three previously discussed main aspects, (revenue sharing, 
multiple resource use and problem animal management). Although local people 
involvement is often documented, some researchers claim that local participation 
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in decision-making is often elusive. In the case of BINP, there seems to be no 
clear mechanisms within the local government structures to involve local 
communities in decision-making processes other than to rely on their 
representatives. If the representatives consult and seek the opinions of the 
represented, that cannot be seen as problematic. However, I have found clear 
indications that the representatives do not involve people in these ways.  
From my results, and in coherence with Ribot et al. (2006), this situation may 
merely reflect the presence of reforms in rhetoric while undermining Power 
devolution in reality. Furthermore, my findings at BINP reveal that not all local 
people participate in village level meetings where consultations are held before 
decisions are made. At other Local Council levels and Parliament where park 
related decisions are made, only local people representatives participate. This 
raises an issue of the effectiveness of this system, particularly in situations were 
local people are never consulted due to financial constraints for mobilization, 
corruption by the local leaders, nepotism or even the leaders making decisions 
basing on their selfish interests. One local informant told me that, ―if inviting 
some few local leaders to represent us in workshops at the district, or with UWA 
officials, is participation, then we can say there is participation at BINP‖ 
(Informant 15).  
Table 2 shows what park related decisions are made at each administrative level 
and that local representatives at each of the different levels have specific 
decisions they can make and issues that they can influence. However, it also 
shows that local communities who mainly participant at village level do not 
directly decide on park related issues, nor influence them. Thus, actual decision-
making regarding resource use and conservation in Uganda is limited to those in 
leadership positions following the top-down approach starting from 
parliamentary level, UWA, the district level (LC V), Sub-county level (LC III), 
Parish level (LC II) and eventually trickles down to the village level (LC I). As I 
have earlier mentioned that local people involvement in decision-making 
processes relies on democratically elected representatives at each of these 
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administrative levels, this would not be an issue of contention if only these 
representatives regularly consulted their electorates before making these 
decisions.  
From a study in Mpungu parish in 2000, Beck (2000)  observed that direct 
involvement of people living around BINP in decision-making processes was 
low. Almost ten years later, my study shows that the situation is still about the 
same and local participation in decision-making at BINP seems more of rhetoric 
rather than an actual practice. This may be as a result of what remains a largely 
top-down conservation approach whereby some participatory aspects are inserted 
into policies and management plans. Namara (2006) observes that the top-down 
approach of making decisions in Uganda, especially regarding natural resource 
management, even under the guise of decentralization and democracy 
undermines the willingness of local communities to participate in these 
processes.  
Accordingly, power ultimately still rests with those in authoritative positions 
over the rest of the people. Thus, in order to evaluate local participation it is 
important to examine when and how local people participate in decision-making 
processes (Sletten 2004). At BINP, I look at each relevant decision-making 
structure particularly and describe when and how local people are involved in 
decision-making. Drawing from Pretty‘s scale of participation, I thus evaluate 
this involvement and identify the type of local participation present at each 
decision-making structure as shown in Table 3. 
As shown in chapter two, Pretty‘s scale of participation encompasses the 
following: manipulative, passive, consultative, functional, interactive, self 
mobilization forms of participation as well as participating for material 
incentives. According to Pretty (1995), each of these types of participation has 
distinct characteristics in terms of how stakeholders are involved and their 
interaction.  
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In Uganda, the highest decision making level on park related issues is the 
parliament. Members of parliament usually consult their electorates and later on 
make decisions their behalf. However most of these consultation meetings are 
viewed by the electorates as information giving meetings where they are asked to 
comment on problems or issues already defined by external agents. Members of 
parliament are under no obligation to adopt people‘s views but to act in the best 
interest of their electorates. Thus, local participation at parliament level is by 
limited consultation or information giving.  
Uganda wildlife Authority that makes decisions oh how to control problem 
animals and decisions on what forest resources and how much can be harvested 
by local people, usually relies on village meetings where they ask local people 
about their concerns, preferences and suggestions regarding park issues. My 
results have shown that some local people participate in these meetings and 
dialogue with UWA because of the inventive to receive material benefits like 
revenue sharing money. This is often confused for participation but according to 
Pretty (1995), it is participation for material incentives because people have no 
stake in prolonging practices when the incentives end and decisions are made by 
the managing authority alone. 
At local council levels III and II, local people are not directly involved in 
decision-making processes. They are only informed of how much revenue 
sharing money has been received from UWA. Their Community Protected Area 
Institution representatives scrutinize local people project proposals, decide on 
which projects will be funded and finally select them. Therefore, local 
participation at BINP at these decision-making levels is largely passive because 
people are only informed of already made decisions. 
At BINP, the village level councils, there are elected representatives for the local 
people but they do not have power to influence park management decisions. 
They are mostly mandated to maintain law and order within their communities, 
solve domestic crises as well as inform their electorates of all decisions made at 
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other local government structures that may affect their communities. These 
representatives are also obliged to mobilize local people for meetings when 
UWA or other stakeholders intend to communicate with them. Local 
participation is by pretence and almost no interaction occurs between local 
people and managing institutions. Drawing from Pretty‘s scale of participation, 
this is manipulative participation. 
However, it can be said that through the Human-Gorilla Conflict Resolution 
group (HUGO), there is functional participation at BINP because here, local 
people often interact with UWA and other conservation stakeholders like CARE 
to share problem animal interventions. However, often major decisions and 
course of action have already been made by those in power. Local people are 
only co-opted to serve external goals of cost reduction from massive crop 
damage and possible human injury from the problem animals. 
 80 
 Table 3: Types of local participation in decision-making at BINP 
Decision-making 
Levels  How and when local people are involved Type of participation 
The Parliament of 
Uganda 
 Members of parliament make decisions on 
behalf of their electorates. 
 
Local participation by limited 
consultation/ information giving  
Uganda Wildlife 
Authority (UWA) 
 Local people answer questions from park 
officials and other external agents about 
their preferred park uses, concerns and 
suggestions. 
 They also participate by receiving material 
benefits such as revenue sharing income. 
Local participation by 
information giving and material 
incentives 
 
Sub-county level (LC 
III) 
 Local people do not directly contribute to 
decisions made at this level. They are only 
informed of how much revenue sharing 
money is available for each parish.  
 They are also asked to submit  project 
proposals that they wish to be funded 
under the revenue sharing scheme 
Passive local participation  
 
 
Parish level (LC II) 
 At this level of decision-making, local 
people are often not involved. The parish 
representatives (CPI) have the mandate to 
make decisions on behalf of the local 
people.  
 Local people are only informed of which 
projects have been selected for funding 
under the revenue sharing scheme.   
 
 Passive local participation 
 
 
Village level (LC I) 
 Local people representatives have no 
power to influence park management 
decisions made.  
Manipulative local participation 
 
Human- gorilla 
conflict resolution 
group (HUGO) 
 Local people interact with other 
stakeholders in authority like UWA to 
make decisions.  
 Often major decisions and course of action 
have already been made by those in power; 
people may simply be co-opted to serve 
external goals.  Functional local participation 
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Although, participatory efforts at BINP are by limited consultation, information 
sharing, material incentive participation and largely passive, my findings reveal 
that local participation in decision-making does not reflect the interactive and 
self-mobilization levels of participation which Pretty ranks as the highest and 
most ideal forms of participation. He claims that at these levels people are 
empowered and able to participate in analysis, formulation and development of 
management or action plans. Here, participation is seen as a right and not just a 
means to achieve project or conservation goals. Thus, according to Pretty (1995), 
these two forms of participation that are absent at BINP would be the most 
appropriate for successful collaborative resource management.  
Normative theories of governance would envisage a ‗win-win‘ outcome if 
conservation and development goals are negotiated in a complementary position, 
with particular active participation of the local people. As can be inferred from 
Pretty‘s typology, for meaningful participation, the local people need to be 
empowered so that they can actively influence the process of decision making. 
However, my empirical data shows that local participation at BINP occurs within 
a framework defined by others. The stronger institutions and actors assert power 
over those that are weaker. 
In the case of BINP, I find that local people are interested in more than benefits 
and mere information sharing and do not feel empowered by the existing forms 
of participation. Overall, their perception is that the current form of participation 
has created but a little difference compared to the earlier days when park 
management made all decisions on its own. 
5.4 Summary 
In this chapter I have addressed objective number two of my study by describing 
the nature of local participation in the decision-making processes at BINP. I have 
also evaluated how local people are involved and identified the types of 
participation at BINP drawing on Pretty‘s scale of participation.  
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Thus, by identifying where local participation at BINP is located on Pretty‘s 
‗ladder‘ of participation, I have found that involving local people in the three 
main aspects of collaborative resource management at BINP is not a reflection of 
local participation in decision-making processes. Participation may include 
involving local people but aims at empowering them where as involving people 
may not always empower them. It is also apparent that lack of meaningful 
decision-making authority is a disincentive for effective local participation.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this study I set out to describe and evaluate the involvement and participation 
of local people in collaborative resource management at BINP. I particularly 
focused on the three main aspects of collaborative resource management and the 
practices and perceptions of the local people living adjacent to BINP in regard to 
these aspects. Finally I described and, based on Pretty‘s scale of participation, 
evaluated how and at what point local people are involved in decision-making.  
Collaborative resource management initiatives at BINP aim at providing local 
communities around BINP with some park related benefits that may improve 
their livelihoods but also at involving them as co-managers in deciding on park 
management issues. I found that, UWA hopes to accomplish these goals through 
the involvement of local people in information sharing avenues, negotiations of 
resource use agreements and sharing 20% of the park entrance fees. However, to 
a rather limited degree, local participation in decision-making at BINP is mainly 
through some devolution of authority, rights and duties from central to local 
levels of governance and other institutional committees such as the Community 
Protected Area Institution (CPI).  
Although it is legitimate in Uganda to be represented by democratically elected 
members in decision-making processes, these representatives are reported to 
often make decisions based on selfish interests and not the general interests of 
their electorates. They are also accused of corruption and nepotism. Besides, 
many of my interviewees believe that the empowerment of local leaders and 
committees like Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) does not 
necessarily mean local people empowerment. This is because active committees 
may be inactive due to limited interaction and consultation with the local people 
they are to represent. 
Furthermore, local participatory efforts that focus on use of democratically 
elected committee members and local government structures can easily create 
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local conflicts and tensions between the electorate and their representatives to the 
extent that local people feel that their participation in decision-making is mostly 
passive. However, in the face of these loopholes, the only option that the local 
people have for influence is to re-elect new representatives in future elections 
and get rid of those accused of misusing power by corruption and favoritism 
based on tribe, gender or social status.  
Hence, the ability of local people to influence or make decisions at BINP is 
limited to having the right to nominate, organize and participate in electing their 
representatives by casting votes. This is however a major challenge to the local 
people living adjacent to BINP because the government of Uganda has not held 
local government elections for the last eight years since November 2001. Thus, it 
is imperative that local government elections are held so that local people may 
exercise their right to electing those representatives that they think would do a 
better job at advocating for their concerns and preferences during decision-
making processes regarding the management of BINP. 
My evaluation of local participation in decision-making at BINP based on 
Pretty‘s scale of participation reveals that although local people are involved in 
aspects of collaborative resource management, participation in decision-making 
is mainly passive where silence is interpreted as consent by those in power. 
Participation is also by manipulation especially where material benefits are 
expected in exchange for local people support and involvement in collaborative 
resource management aspects. Therefore, my study makes a contribution to the 
knowledge on local participation in relation to protected areas by revealing that 
involving local people in aspects of conservation does not necessarily imply local 
participation or empowerment.  
I thus, recommend that there is a need to contextualize local participation in 
terms of seeing it as a right, therefore an ‗end‘ in itself leading to empowerment 
rather than limiting it to benefit sharing as a ‗means‘ of attaining pre-set 
conservation goals as is the case at BINP. 
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Situating my findings within previous literature on local participation such as 
Mutebi (2003) and Namara (2006), I was surprised to discover that at BINP 
involving local people in aspects of collaborative resource management was 
often referred to as participation which is clearly not the case as I have shown in 
my study. I however, agree with other previous research findings and conclusions 
about BINP that although local participation cannot be forced, people‘s 
motivation to participate in all aspects of collaborative resource management 
including decision-making should be reviewed.  
Finally, more research at BINP and other protected areas should be done as a 
continuation of this study to look into how local people can be fully engaged in 
participatory efforts especially in decision-making processes because local 
participation involves more than simply being passive participants or 
participating benefits and material incentives in the three main aspects of 
collaborative resource management. 
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Appendix I: List of key informant organisations and local interviews 
recorded at BINP in Nov. 2008 
A total of ten Key informants from the following Organizations: 
1. Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) -4 
2. Community Protected Area Institution (CPI) -2 
3. Christian Action Research and Education (CARE) -2 
4. Local Council leaders (LC) -1  
5. Bwindi Impenetrable Forest Conservation Trust (BIFCT) -1 
 
A total of twenty six local people interviews 
            Parish one -Nyambare 
1. Interviewee   
2. Interviewee   
3. Interviewee  
4. Interviewee 
5. Interviewee 
6.  Interviewee  
7.  Interviewee 
8.  Interviewee 
9.  Interviewee 
10.  Interviewee  
11.  Interviewee 
12.  Interviewee 
13.  Interviewee 
      Parish two- Mushanje 
 
14.  Interviewee  
15.  Interviewee  
16.  Interviewee   
17.  Interviewee   
18.  Interviewee   
19.  Interviewee  
20.  Interviewee  
21.  Interviewee  
22.  Interviewee  
23.  Interviewee   
24.  Interviewee  
25.  Interviewee  
26.  Interviewee   
 
 ii 
A total of four participatory observation meetings I attended 
1.  HUGO meeting (Human-gorilla conflict resolution group) 
2.  Revenue sharing mobilization meeting   
3.  Meeting with a group of Batwa forest people at BINP 
4.  Workshop organized by ITFC in Kabale on conservation of BINP 
 iii 
Appendix II: Research permit for the field study 
 
 iv 
Appendix III: Gorrilla tracking certificate received during participatory 
observation 
 
 v 
Appendix IV: Interview guide for key informants  
Exchange of pleasantries and greetings. Brief introduction about the researcher 
and research problem. 
Is it OK for you that I use a recorder – in order to use the time more effectively 
and also to make sure that I get what you say right? 
- What administrative position do you hold? 
- How long have you had this position? 
- What did you do before? 
- What is your education background? 
 
- I have specific questions on the organization. But first: I wonder if you 
can give your views of thought about Bwindi Impenetrable NP in relation 
to the people living adjacent to this NP? 
- What are the main aspects of collaborative resource management at 
BINP? 
o What are the mechanisms through which local people are involved 
in these aspects? 
o About economic benefits, how are they distributed to various 
projects and receivers? 
 
- Can you tell me specifically about the story of local people participation in 
decision-making processes at BINP? 
 - Questions on participation aspects: 
- How would you describe the relationship between other stakeholders and 
UWA?  
- What is the role of local government in the management of BINP? 
- In what ways are local people involved in the management of BINP? 
- Do local people have any influence on park management decisions? 
- What is your general comment on the level of community involvement in 
conservation at BINP? 
- Any final thoughts, suggestions about involvement and local participation 
in collaborative resource management at BINP? 
 vi 
Appendix V: Interview guide for local people  
Interviewee‘s name ................ Education............................ 
District             ...................................... 
County............................................................. 
Sub county.................... Parish ................................... 
Village…….. .................... Sex.................................. 
Age    ........................................................................        
Primary occupation      ...................     H/H size................................................ 
1. How many years have you lived here........................................................ 
 
2.  Do you or any member of your household interact with the park? 
 
Yes .........  No .......... 
 
3.  If yes, explain how? E.g. Labor, tourist guide ,ranger, porter, resource  
use.......................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
..........................      If No, explain why you are not involved? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
4. What changes have you observed with the management of the park since its 
gazzettement from a forest reserve? 
 vii 
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
Do you like the changes? 
Yes......................     No......................... like/do not like some.......................... 
5. Can you tell me how these change/s have impacted on the livelihood of your 
family/community. 
List the positive impact/s 
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
.... 
List the negative impact/s 
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
.... 
5. What are the aspects of collaborative resource management at BINP? 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………. 
 viii 
6. Are you in any way involved in these aspects of collaborative resource 
management? 
Yes........................................................   No......................................... 
If yes, how did you come to get involved? 
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
.... 
In what ways are you involved?  
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
.... 
At what level are you involved? 
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
... 
If not involved, explain why not? 
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................
...  
 ix 
 
7. Does the park authority involve local people in the management of the park, 
especially in regard to decision-making?  
If Yes, How and if No, why? 
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
.............................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
8. How do you rate the consideration and implementation of your 
opinions/suggestions by UWA regarding park management issues like revenue 
generation, sharing and resource use? 
a. Highly considered         b.  Moderately considered      c.  Least considered    
d.  Not considered   
 
a. Highly implemented     b. moderately implemented    c. least implemented 
d. Not implemented          
 
Thank you for giving me your time to participate in this interview. This is the 
end of it, thanks again and hopefully we meet again. 
Name of interviewee………. 
Time of interview from……………to……………. 
Date of interview…………… 
 
